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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
1.1 Overview
Since the first flight of a heavier-than-air aircraft at Kitty Hawk on December 17, 1903,
aircraft designers have achieved tremendous performance gains in speed, altitude, payload,
and range. While these improvements are impressive, evaluating the progress of
aeronautics merely in terms of these performance measures would not provide an adequate
description of the technology’s evolution. In recent years, revolutionary developments in
digital electronics and communications have altered basic concepts in military aircraft
design and operation. For instance, in the past, with only mechanical flight controls at their
disposal, engineers had no choice but to design inherently stable aircraft. Today, digital fly-
by-wire control systems make possible the design of highly agile aircraft which are
unstable—and would otherwise be uncontrollable by a pilot. The impact of information
technologies on weapons systems is even more pronounced. Early air combat involved
pilots from opposing sides shooting at each other with infantry arms they had carried in
their cockpits. Today, engagements can take place beyond visual range and bombs can
follow laser beams to their targets.
The advent of information technologies has enabledthe Department of Defense
(DoD) of the United States to acquire systems with capabilities far beyond what had been
state-of-the-art just a few years earlier or had not even existed. Between 30 and 40 percent
of the development and procurement costs of a new weapon system can be attributed to
electronic hardware and software. As systems get “s arter”, this percentage will only
increase. With the declining level of defense expenditures driving industry to adopt lean
production practices, the development process for hardware/software systems must be a
focal point of efforts to get more “bang for the buck”.
The goal of lean development of hardware/software systems poses complex
development and acquisition challenges for DoD and American industry. Currently, the
development of hardware and software in the defense industry is complicated by the
following factors:1
• “Material needs” can be satisfied by many combinations of mechanical nd
electronic systems (hardware and software).
• Technology development processes are heavily influenced by the DoD
acquisition process.
• This DoD acquisition process, which evolved to procure mechanical systems, is
mechanically-oriented and frequently has difficulty when developing
information-based weapons systems.
• Traditional methods partition an electronic system into hardware and software
elements and develop these elements eparately, despite the tight coupling
between “hardware” and “software” in most complex electronic system design
problems.
• The administratively driven development process of defense electronic systems
is often slower than the evolution of basic electronic technologies, which means
that the final program result may be more costly than similar commercially
available systems.
                                                
1These factors were identified in the course of field research conducted by Martin Anderson and Alex Hou in
support of the Lean Aircraft Initiative consisting of numerous interviews with both government and
industry officials. The interview sample included officials from both sponsoring and non-sponsoring
companies and government agencies.
As part of the Lean Aircraft Initiative, a research program studying the applicability
of lean production principles to the defense aircraft industry sponsored by the Air Force
and over 20 aerospace companies, this report evaluates a set of five complex electronic
system development methodologies for applicability as a lean electronic hardware/software
system development methodology and analyzes the implications of the evaluation results.2
1.2 Outline of Report
This report is based upon a combination of extensive literature review, including the most
contemporary public documents from the Department of Defense, and upon field and phone
interviews conducted under the auspices of the Lean Aircraft Initiative.
The remaining sections of this chapter discuss the challenge of reconciling the
strategic needs of the American military with the declining level of defense expenditures in
the post-Cold War world, the increasing importance of electronics and software in military
systems, and the development challenges that have arisen as a result.
A set of new methodologies for complex electronic system development is
discussed in Chapter 2. Each of these methodologies has demonstrated significant
improvements in development performance or shows potential for similarly significant
improvements.
Chapter 3 describes the criteria that were developed to evaluate the methodologies
for possible application as a cross-system integration methodology. Each methodology is
evaluated, and the results are discussed. Details of each individual evaluation are also
included.
Chapter 4 discusses the implications of the evaluation results. A possible
foundation for a lean hardware/software d velopment methodology is described.
Conclusions and recommendations derived from this research are summarized. The final
section details recommendations for further study.
A more detailed technical description of the practices behind one of the complex
electronic system development methodologies evaluated in this report is provided in the
Appendix.
                                                
2 This report was derived from research performed in the development of a master’s thesis written by this
author.
1.3 THE NEW CALCULUS
The end of the Cold War injected a high degree of uncertainty into the national security
planning process of the United States. For decades, the subject of how to defeat he
numerically superior forces of the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies in wartime had
been the focus of defense planners, strategists, and wargamers in the U.S. and the other
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries. Suddenly, our sworn enemies had
become our new friends, triggering euphoria over the promise of a new world order and a
peace dividend. The depolarization of the world left defense planners without a clear threat
to replace the Soviet Union.
However, while the collapse of the Soviet Union has fundamentally altered U.S.
strategy and force planning, the need for powerful and decisive U.S. military capabilities
endures. If the United States is to remain engaged in world affairs, the ability to bring
military power to bear when appropriate to protect its interests, as well as those of its allies,
must be maintained. Although there are a wide range of potential military threats to
American interests, regional conflicts have become the new focus of U.S. military
planning. These types of conflicts present several challenges for the U.S. military including
numerous potential locales, smaller forward deployments, hort warning times distant
deployments, and increasingly capable weapons in the hands of adversaries.
As a part of the reexamination of U.S. national military strategy, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff (JCS) recommended that the United States should field forces capable of defeating
aggressors in two concurrent, geographically separated major regional conflicts (MRCs). 3
Recently, an evaluation of the capability of U.S. forces to achieve key operational
objectives in future major regional conflicts was published by RAND. This study, called
The New Calculus: Analyzing Airpower’s Changing Role in Joint Theater Campaigns,
took the two-MRC requirement as a given element of national military strategy and
assessed U.S. military capabilities to fulfill the mission—focusing particularly on possible
means of enhancing airpower’s capabilities in joint operations.
                                                
3 In this context, concurrent major regional conflicts are conflicts that erupt sequentially but overlap so that
they must be prosecuted simultaneously at times.
RAND’s analysis concluded that the projected capabilities of U.S. forces would
enable it to satisfy the two-MRC requirement, although the effectiveness of forces in the
second theater would be highly dependent on the degree of concurrency of the two
conflicts as well as the outcome of the first MRC. Regarding the role of airpower, it
concluded that “the calculus has changed and airpower’s ability to contribute to the joint
battle has increased” (Bowie et al., 1993, p. 83). The combination of modern airpower’s
lethality in conventional operations, which has been greatly enhanced by the employment
of advanced precision-guided munitions and modern C4I (Communications, Command,
Control, Computers and Intelligence) systems, and its strategic mobility and survivability
make it a good match for the needs of short-warning MRCs.
To fully exploit the potential of airpower, the RAND study made a number of
recommendations aimed at nsuring that U.S. forces could establish and maintain air
superiority and enhance its ability to contribute to other aspects of the joint battle. Detailed
simulations indicated that equipping current fighters with AMRAAM (Advanced Medium
Range Air-to-Air Missile) would ensure air superiority until some time around the year
2000. However, to ensure air superiority over the long term, simulations indicated that a
next generation platform, such as the F-22, would be needed in addition to the continued
development and procurement of advanced air-to-air missiles (Bowie et al., 1993).
The recommendation to equip our future air forces with more advanced munitions
extended beyond the air superiority role to the strategic air offensive and ground campaigns
as well. To supplement existing U.S. capabilities—based mainly on fighters and
sea-launched cruise missiles—in strategic air offensive operations, the study advocated
equipping long-range bombers with precision-guided munitions and standoff weapons,
significantly increasing both the effectiveness of early attacks on strategic assets and the
rate of destruction of these targets. To enhance the ability of U.S. forces to halt the advance
of enemy ground forces and establish an assured defense, RAND’s analysis indicated that
employment of dispensers equipped with smart anti-armor submunitions, uch as the
Sensor Fuzed Weapon (SFW), could stop a force of 10 armored and mechanized divisions
in approximately half the time required by the same forces armed with current weapons.
Furthermore, B-2 bombers equipped with inertially-guided dispensers filled with smart
submunitions could be used to provide additional anti-armor capability in the early stages of
the conflict and further decrease the time required to halt an armored invasion (Bowie et al.,
1993).
The analysis also indicated a need to procure additional fighters such as the F-15E,
whose long range, heavy payload, and modern avionics make it a highly effective and
versatile asset. Finally, a rapidly deployable theater C4I system—a goal believed to be
achievable through the integration of current systems provided that planned upgrades
materialize—was deemed essential to the effective and efficient prosecution of airpower’s
missions within the joint operations framework (Bowie et al., 1993).
Although equipping our forces with advanced munitions, advanced fighters, and
rapidly deployable theater C4I systems would allow a smaller force structure to support
U.S. national military strategy, these enhancements would surely require a considerable
investment. Appropriating funds for this purpose could be difficult since changes in the
international security and economic environments have created momentum for the
downsizing of the U.S. military and decreasing levels of defense expenditures. This is
perhaps the real “new calculus”—cost is now as important as system performance. With
the major budgetary impact being felt in procurement which is estimated to be down 47
percent from the peak years of the buildup during the 1980’s, the greatest challenge for
DoD in the post-Cold War era may be how to maximize its “bang for the buck”.
If achieving greater efficiency has become an imperative for DoD, it
has become a matter of survival in the aerospace industry. Aerospace industry
shipments in 1993 fell 11 percent in real terms and were also expected to fall 11 percent in
1994 from 1993 levels (DoC, 1994). Historically, the industry earned at least half of its
revenues from military sales. The worldwide decline in defense spending has reduced the
demand for military aircraft, missiles, avionics, and other related equipment from U.S.
suppliers. The most recent DoD budget request represented a cumulative real decline in
defense spending of more than 40 percent since the peak of the buildup in 1985 (DoC,
1994).
Unlike past downturns in defense spending, the commercial sector has experienced
a concurrent slump in demand for its products and is unable to sustain the industry’s
current level of capacity. Adding to the overcapacity problem are aircraft manufacturers
from the former Soviet Union—currently operating at production rates less than one-third
of capacity—who have joined the fray in vying for military aircraft sales in the export
market (DoC, 1994).
While the aerospace industry in general has suffered greatly during the recent
downturn, the military aircraft sector, where the U.S. Government historically accounts
for 80 percent of all sa es with Foreign Military Sales and direct exports collectively
accounting for the remaining 20 percent, has been particularly hard hit by declining
defense procurements (DoC, 1994). The resulting downward trend in total shipments of
complete U.S. military aircraft is shown in Figure 1.1. While intensifying competition for
shrinking defense procurement dollars has driven some companies to diversify into
commercial markets or sell off their defense businesses entirely, many have decided to
remain focused on the defense market and outlast the competition. For these companies,
improving the efficiency and the effectiveness of their operations through the reengineering
of business processes and implementation of leaner practices is paramount.
Figure 1.1: Shipments of U.S. Military Aircraft (1980-1994)
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Estimates and forecasts for years 1993 and 1994 by International Trade Administration.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Industrial Outlook 1994.
1.4 Importance of Hardware and Software
Electronic hardware and software are important elements in all the key factors for
dramatically increasing U.S. capabilities for destroying enemy forces cited in The New
Calculus: advanced munitions, avionics, and aircraft and enhanced and rapidly deployable
theater C4I capabilities, such as those provided by AWACS and JSTARS (Bowie et al.,
1993).
Another indicator of the importance of electronic hardware and software is the high
electronic content of military systems. A chart illustrating the forecasted range of variation
of electronic content for some typical defense syst ms is shown in Figure 1.2. Here,
electronic ontent is the percentage of defense procurement and RDT&E (Research,
Development, Test and Evaluation) outlays that are devoted to electronics hardware and
software. Clearly, the data in Figure 1.2 indicate that all of the selected systems possess a
substantial level of electronic ontent. Even aircraft, which have the lowest level of
electronic content of the set of selected systems, are expected to have levels of electronic
content ranging between 30 and 35 percent. In modern aircraft development programs,
avionics can be the “killer” expense, costing around $7000 per pound to develop (Rich and
Janos, 1994). Missiles contain a higher level of electronic content, and the theater C4I
systems—ARSV (Airborne Reconnaissance, Surveillance & Verification) systems,
electronics and communications systems, and space systems4—possess the highest
electronic content levels of all. Overall, the substantial levels of electronic content indicate
that electronic hardware and software are integral elements of our military capabilities.
Perhaps the most convincing indicators of the importance of hardware and software are the
enhanced military capabilities that are made possible by electronic systems.5 To fully
appreciate the significance of these capabilities, it is useful to consider the past. During
World War II, it required 4,500 sorties by B-17 bombers and 9,000 bombs to accomplish
what a F-117A can do on one sortie with a single bomb (Toffler and Tof ler,1993).
                                                
4 Space systems include C4I assets such as early warning satellites and communications satellites.
5 In fact, many believe that the widespread use and proliferation of advanced information and communication
technologies is driving a revolution in warfare (Toffler and Toffler, 1993; Krepinevich, 1994; Arquilla and
Ronfeldt, 1992; Hou, 1994).
Figure 1.2: Electronic Content Variation for Selected Systems, 1990-2001
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During the Vietnam War, accomplishing the same mission required 95 sorties an 190
bombs (Toffler and Toffler, 1993). While attempting to destroy the Thanh Hoa bridge,
American pilots flew 800 sorties and lost ten planes without achieving success. The bridge
stood intact until a flight of four F-4s armed with some of the earliest smart bombs
accomplished the task in a single pass (Toffler and Toffler, 1993).
Whereas the crew of a Vietnam-era M-60 tank had to find cover and come to a stop
before firing, the crew of a modern M-1 Abrams tank can fire while on the move (Toffler
and Toffler, 1993). Similarly, while the chances of a M-60’s crew being able to hit a target
2,000 yards away t night are slim, night-vision devices, laser ranging systems, and
computerized targeting systems which compensate for heat, wind, and other conditions
assure that the M-1 crew will score hits nine times out of ten (Toffler and Toffler, 1993).
Clearly, the armored groups whose tanks are equipped with these enabling systems have a
significant edge over forces that are not. As was the case with the early smart bombs, the
Vietnam War also demonstrated the utility of advanced avionics. Before the fielding f
advanced bombing systems, pilots could not do much “jinking” (erratic flight) and still
have any chance of delivering their payload on target. The advanced bombing systems
compensated for altitude, speed, and a moderate amount of jinking, affording the pilot a
significantly higher degree of protection while enhancing his accuracy (Momyer, 1978).
Modern systems can enable a pilot to use dumb bombs with a high degree of accuracy.
During the war in the Gulf, precise position information provided by Global
Positioning System (GPS) receivers to coalition forces allowed the desert sands to be
navigated with a high degree of confidence (Schwarzkopf, 1992). This capability was
crucial since the desert was devoid of landmarks—even the sand dunes shifted. The
capability enhancing potential of GPS was clearly demonstrated in the first strike of the war
by the successful helicopter raid on the Iraqi early-warning radar sites. According to the
Pentagon’s final report on the Gulf War, the raid was made possible because of night- and
low-light vision technologies and the precise navigational capability afforded by the Global
Positioning System (DoD, 1992).
While the media made the public aware of the capabilities of precision-guided
weapons and other enabling technologies such as night-vision goggles and GPS receivers
during the Gulf War, two of the most powerful information weapons of all—AWACS and
JSTARS—were relegated to relative obscurity. The E-3 Sentry, otherwise known as
AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System), is a modified Boeing 707 aircraft,
crammed with computers, radar, communications gear, and sensors. In both Desert Shield
and Desert Storm, the AWACS aircraft scanned the skies in all directions to detect enemy
aircraft or missiles, sending targeting data to ground units and interceptors.
The ground-scanning counterpart of AWACS was the Joint Surveillance Target and
Attack Radar System (JSTARS). The E-8A JSTARS aircraft is a modified Boeing 707
equipped with a multi-mode radar for detection and tracking of enemy forces, processing
equipment, mission crew work stations, and command and control interfaces. Data
collected on board are then relayed to six ground station modules that receive radar data
processed by the aircraft in real time. The data can then be analyzed by ground commanders
for battlefield application (Swalm, 1992).
At the start of the Gulf crisis, the JSTARS system was still in development testing
and at least three years remained before an initial production decision was to be made.
However, its potential for locating Iraqi tanks was so impressive that the only two existing
prototypes were deployed to Saudi Arabia (Swalm, 1992).
JSTARS was initially limited in operations to performing a surveillance role. After
only two days, this limitation was removed and a weapons allocation officer was assigned
to control his own F-15Es, especially in the campaign against tactical ballistic missile sites.
Over the course of operations, Joint STARS evolved to serve in a C4I (Command,
Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence) capacity as part of an
interconnected network of these assets, which included AWACS, the RC-135 Rivet Joint
electronic eavesdropping aircraft, the Airborne Command and Control Center (ABCCC),
and various Army and Air Force command and intelligence centers. Linking JSTARS and
AWACS together provided coalition commanders with a comprehensive picture of enemy
tactical movements on the ground and in the air (Swalm, 1992).
By all accounts, JSTARS was a boon for coalition forces.6 Ground commanders
could track the movements of enemy forces on a real-time basis, from as far away as 155
miles, under all weather conditions. Aircraft directed by Joint STARS had a 90 percent
success rate in finding targets on the first pass, and clo e air support and interdiction
aircraft consistently ran out of ammunition before they ran low on fuel once JSTARS
became operational (Swalm, 1992). By the end of the war, the two JSTARS aircraft had
flown 49 sorties, logging 535 hours of flight time, successfully detected over 1,000
targets, and controlled 750 fighters. Attesting to the system’s revolutionary capabilities, Air
Force Chief of Staff General McPeak said, “We will never again want to fight a war
without a Joint STARS kind of system.”
                                                
6 For interdiction missions, JSTARS could use its synthetic aperture radar to provide real-time damage
assessment and direct immediate re-attacks. On one occasion, two A-10s and an AC-130 directed by
JSTARS destroyed 58 out of 61 vehicles in convoy (Swalm, 1992). In another instance, an Iraqi unit
mustering to attack VII Corps was 80 percent disabled before it could engage any of the corps’s units
(Swalm, 1992). In a similar scenario, a unit of the Republican Guard preparing to launch a counterattack
was detected by JSTARS and targeted from a ground station and destroyed by Army Apache attack
helicopters (Swalm, 1992). JSTARS also played a significant role in hunting mobile Scud launchers, first
locating their positions and then passing that information on to ground-based and airborne strike assets
(Swalm, 1992).
1.5 DEFINING THE DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGE
While electronic hardware/software systems are integr l to the performance of defense
systems, the development of hardware and software in an effective and efficient manner
remains an elusive goal. High quality and reliability are extremely important since even
small errors can severely degrade the performance of the system.
For instance, the AMRAAM program experienced both the difficulties involved in
integrating AMRAAM software with various aircraft systems and the adverse effects of
minor software problems. In one four-on-four test, all four missiles failed to hit their
targets. Three missiles failed because the radar detected false targets. The failure of the
fourth missile was caused by a software problem—a constant that the missile’s computer
used in some calculations was wrong—that required only a few lines of code to be changed
(Mayer, 1993).
In addition to the challenge of developing and fielding high-quality hardware and
software, it is also necessary to consider other factors that should shape the development
challenge. The following is a list of some of these factors:
a) Declining defense outlays. Cuts in the defense budget will result in lower levels
of development and procurement expenditures.
b) Long service lives. Historically, defense systems tend to have longer service
lives than were originally intended at the outset of development. In addition,
since DoD will not be able to afford as many new systems as it has in the past,
fielded systems and newly developed systems may have their service lives
stretched out even longer than in the past.
c) Rapid improvement of technology. Modern weapons ystems have a high
degree of electronic ontent. The performance of electronic hardware and
software technologies continues to advance rapidly and shows no signs of
slowing down. The performance of these technologies that are such an integral
part of theater systems can improve dramatically over the service lifetime of a
fielded system.
d) Growth in complexity. Demands for ever more advanced capabilities and the
rapid improvement of technology have created a rapid increase in the complexity
of new electronic hardware/software systems.
Factor a highlights the importance of ensuring the development of electronic
hardware/software systems in an affordable manner. Factors b and c point to the need for
newly developed electronic hardware/software systems to be upgradable, evolvable, and
maintainable. Factor d points to the need for a development methodology which can be
scaled to cope effectively with the increasing complexity of advanced electronic systems.
Thus, a lean hardware/software system development methodology must be scalable
and be capable of producing a high-quality product hat is affordable, upgradable,
evolvable, and maintainable.
CHAPTER 2
New Methods for Complex
Electronic System Development
To effectively address the challenges of developing modern complex electronic
hardware/software systems, a lean development methodology needs to be devised. With
this in mind, a set of complex electronic system development methodologies was
investigated with the hope of finding a methodology that could be directly applied in this
role or could at least provide a starting point for the development of a suitable
methodology. This set included the following methodologies:
• The rapid development process used to develop the flight control software for
the DC-X
• The GritTech rapid development process
• Ptolemy-supported hardware/software codesign
• The RASSP (Rapid Prototyping of Application Specific Signal Processors)
design methodology1
• Cleanroom software engineering
Each of the methodologies described in this chapter has produced significant improvements
in the development of complex electronic systems or shows great potential
                                                
1 Note that both Ptolemy-supported hardware/software codesign and the RASSP design metodology are
grouped together loosely under section 3.3, “Hardware/Software Codesign.”
for producing similarly significant improvements. These methodologies will be evaluated in
Chapter 3 for their applicability as a lean hardware/software development methodology.
“Complex electronic system” is an umbrella term used to denote any system or
group of systems which contain a large amount of electronic2 hardware and software.
Complex electronic systems can range from RAM-based field programmable gate arrays or
digital signal processors running assembly code algorithms to JSTARS andbeyond to
include what we have denoted as “theater systems”.
These systems are inherently “complex” because of the dramatic increase in the
complexity of the hardware and software that are used in the development of even “simple”
products. Consider, for instance, the development of a printed circuit module. The number
of semiconductor gate equivalents contained by a typical (6 inch x 9 inch) printed circuit
module increased by a factor of 20 between the 1980s and the 1990s. In the 1980s one of
these modules ran at clock speeds between one and five megahertz. In the 1990s a module
of similar size might run at clock speeds of 50 MHz or more. The size and complexity of
the software contained in the modules has also displ yed a similarly explosive rate of
growth. Today, one of these modules may store more than four megabytes of code and/or
data.
This growth in complexity is also evident at the avionic system level. The F-4s that
saw combat in Vietnam did not have a digital computer on board and had no software. The
first fighter aircraft equipped with digital computers were developed in the 1960s. These
systems, which performed fire control tasks, required between 100 and 200 four- to eight-
bit words of assembly language code. In the 1980s the software requirement had grown to
approximately 400,000 eight- to sixteen-bit words of a combination of assembly language
and higher-order languages to perf rm more complex functions including fire control,
navigation, engine control, built-in-test, electronic warfare, flight control, stores
management, and controls and displays (EIA, 1988).
This shift from solving relatively simple problems in software to solving problems
of much greater complexity occurred during the mid 1970s. The F-16As, developed during
the 1970s, were equipped with seven computer systems, 50 digital processors, and
                                                
2 For the purposes of this report, other types of systems, such as photonic or optoelectronic, could also fall
under the broad category of “electronic systems.”
135,000 lines of code (EIA, 1988). Produced in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the F-14D
has 15 computer systems, 300 digital processors, and 236,000 lines of code. The B-2
reportedly has over 200 processors and approximately 5 million lines of code (Anderson
and Dorfman, 1991). Currently, the F-22 has approximately 1.3 million lines of code on
board, and has 4 million lines of code when the fighter’s support systems are included.3
Even transport aircraft exhibit this explosive growth in hardware and software complexity.
The C-17, which is the most computerized, software-intensive, transport aircraft ever built,
has 56 computerized avionics subsystems which use 19 different ypes of embedded
computers incorporating over 80 microprocessors and nearly 1.36 million lines of code
(GAO, 1992).
The explosive growth in the complexity of hardware/software systems has made the
development of these systems all the more difficult. The rate of increase in difficulty of
system design and integration problems threatened to outstrip the rate of improvement of
methods developed within existing paradigms. This realization provided the impetus for the
creation of the methodologies discussed at length in the remaining sections of this chapter.
2.1 RAPID DEVELOPMENT DC-X STYLE 4
For the past several years, McDonnell Douglas Aerospace-West (MDA-W) has been
developing a flight software development process known as RAPIDS (Rapid Prototyping
and Integrated Design System). McDonnell Douglas Aerospace has applied RAPIDS to
more than 15 projects including several flight and ground test programs including Single
Stage Rocket Technology (SSRT) and Ground Based Interceptor. Phase II of the SSRT
Program, awarded to MDA-W in August 1991, provided another opportunity to
demonstrate the effectiveness of this methodology.
As a result of customer insight, software development, cost, schedule and reliability
issues were closely scrutinized early in the program. This provided MDA-W with the
                                                
3 Telephone interview with Chris Blake, Avionics IPT leader, F-22 SPO. July 16, 1994
4 This section is based upon phone interviews with Mr. Matt Maras of MDA-W and Dr. Jo Uhde-Lacovara
of JSC’s Rapid Development Laboratory and publications which they provided (Maras et al., 1994; Uhde-
Lacovara et al., 1994).
opportunity to propose the use of a non-traditional process based on an integrated system
level approach to the Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GN&C) design.
The entire Operational Flight Program (OFP) used by the Delta Clipper
Experimental (DC-X1) was designed, coded, integrated, and tested in 24 months. The
66,000 source lines of Ada code were used by the DC-X1 to complete nine system level
static fire tests and three fully successful flight tests. Encompassing an autonomous GN&C
capability, the flight control portion of the OFP was developed entirely within the integrated
design and rapid prototyping environment.
In addition to the flight software (FSW) developed with this approach, test code,
representing high fidelity models of the vehicle, its aerodynamics, sensors and actuators,
and winds were also designed by employing the same methodology. Almost 70 percent of
the new vehicle software developed for the DC-X1 program was produced with the
integrated design environment, using automated code generation (Maras et al., 1994).
2.1.1 The Traditional Approach
The traditional approach to developing f ight software displays the symptoms of what
Hammer and Champy (1993) refer to as “process fragm ntation”. Engineers killed in
particular problem domains formulate detailed requirements for the systems and
subsystems. During the requirements design phase, engineers develop and test candidate
GN&C algorithms. A non-real-time engineering simulation is created to compare the
performance of different algorithms. Several reviews are scheduled uring this phase
resulting in the elimination of some algorithms from further consideration. Following the
selection of an algorithm or a set of algorithms, a requirements document is written.
These requirements are then passed on to other organizations which interpret the
requirements and translate them into actual computer code. Once the code is written and
tested, it is delivered to organizations responsible for the integration of the hardware with
the software and testing of the resulting system. Typically, this is where many unforeseen
problems arise—late in the schedule where problems are most difficult and costly to fix.
Corrections are especially costly when changes to the requirements must be made. For
example, a change in the mission requirements may necessitate changing the flight software
requirements. These changes can require extensive modifications to the FSW. To
make matters worse, the change process is usually conducted in the same fragmented,
sequential manner as the original design iteration.
2.1.2 The RAPIDS Process
RAPIDS is a highly iterative process utilizing rapid prototyping techniques. Each rapid
prototyping cycle develops a complete GN&C system from requirements definition through
design and implementation  a target processor. Processor-in-loop (PIL) testing is
performed once the initial working FSW prototype is developed.
This approach allows problems with software design, implementation, or hardware
selection to be discovered early in the development cycle. This cycle of concurrent
requirements and software development and PIL testing is repeated until FSW with the
desired performance and quality is produced. The approach employed by RAPIDS is a
spiral development approach where developers “build a little, test a little”. This process is
illustrated in Figure 2.1.
Each RAPIDS design cycle involves phases which can be found in a traditional
process—requirements, design, development, and integration and test—that are performed
with varying degrees of concurrency. Cycle time decreases with each iteration while the
quality of the FSW increases. Whereas a traditional approach may require years to complete
a single design cycle, initial iterations of a RAPIDS process may require months and then
only weeks as the design matures. Ultimately, the design cycle may be on the order of a
few days or less. However, regardless of the length of the design cycle, configuration
control and complete software validation testing are maintained.
A designer in a RAPIDS process is part of a small, integrated team and is involved
for the whole design, development, and validation process. Using an integrated team of
system designers means that the distinctions between systems engineering, GN&C
engineering, and software engineering break down—a single team member may be asked
to perform any of these functions over the course of a development program. Whereas in
the past each functional discipline would own only a portion of the final design and only a
certain phase of the program, the RAPIDS design team has ownership of the entire process
and end product. Indicators are that end-to-end ownership of the product and process tends
to be more efficient and promotes a more productive work environment for the designers
(Maras et al., 1994).
Figure 2.1: RAPIDS Spiral Development Process
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Note: Hardware-in-loop testing involves the actual flight hardware.  Processor-in-loop testing is performed
with commercially equivalent hardware.
2.1.3 RAPIDS Toolset
The RAPIDS toolset integrates requirements analysis through hardware and software
testing in a workstation environment using an integrated set of commercial off-the-shelf
software development and simulation tools. The graphical user interface toolset captures
design details being implemented by GN&C experts and then automatically generates
source code and documentation that can be targeted to the actual flight vehicle computer
system. The environment is currently based on commercially available products including
ISI’s (Integrated Systems, Inc.) MATRIXX/SystemBuild/AutoCode/AC-100
TM and
Cadre Teamwork.
MATRIXX/SystemBuild is a graphical software tool that enables users to develop
data flow block diagrams of the desired system using elementary building blocks. These
elementary blocks can be organized into “Superblocks” which become procedures or
subtasks. This construction process yields highly modular software designs hich can
facilitate the development of generic software libraries and the reuse of software. After
construction is completed, the software data flow diagrams can be interactively tested in a
non-real-time environment. Time and frequency domain analyses can also be performed
interactively.
The AutoCode tool can automatically translate the block diagram representations
into FORTRAN, C, or Ada source code. The source code can then be integrated with other
interfacing software—software necessary for the code to run on the target processor such
as a real-time operating system device driver, compiled and run on the AC-100 real-time
computer to verify real-time and PIL performance.
2.1.4 Benefits of the RAPIDS Process
The ultimate benefit of this approach is a cost reduction because of the smaller software
development staff necessary to support initial requirements definition through test and
integration. The reduction in software development staffing is possible since the application
or GN&C designer does the majority of these activities within an integrated, graphical
workstation environment. Other benefits of the methodology include the following:
• Software is not a schedule critical item, and the best design can be implemented
at flight time because it is not limited by the typical six to twelve month lead
time required by a traditional process to make software changes. The design that
flies can be based on the best available data and algorithms from all previous
testing.
• Challenging milestones, which are typical of fast paced programs, can be met
while maintaining or enhancing the quality of the final software product.
• The rapid prototyping process allows major errors and design flaws to be
discovered earlier in the program when they are cheaper and easier to correct.
• Requirements can be verified early in the development program.
• Metrics tracked during DC-X1 software development indicated that the RAPIDS
process can result in productivity improvements greater than 25 percent.
The Navigation, Control & Aeronautics Division at NASA’s Johnson Space Center
employed a similar process to construct a simulation of the Soyuz Assured Crew Return
Vehicle flight software and demonstrated substantial productivity gains when compared to
COCOMO model estimates. The data are shown in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Soyuz Simulation Project Metrics
Phase 1 Phase 2
Number of Superblocks 55 371
Number of SLOC 4102 25045a
COCOMO Estimated Total Staff-Hours 3400 11658
Estimated Total Staff-Hours 1830 7720
SLOC per Staff-Day 18 22b
Productivity Increase (Actual vs. COCOMO) 85% 50%
Source: Uhde-Lacovara et al. (1994)
a.This figure includes the lines of code produced in Phase 1.
b.Reuse of Phase 1 software is assumed.  Thus, the number of SLOC from Phase 1 was not included
in calculating this value.
2.2 RAPID DEVELOPMENT THE GRITTECH WAY
Recognizing that the rate of complexity growth in electronic hardware and software was
rapidly outdistancing the ability of its engineers to keep pace, GritTech5 began to
experiment with rapid development processes and enabling technologies to determine if
dramatic improvements in productivity could be made. The basic question addressed in
formulating a rapid development process was how to change the traditional process to
exploit more fully the potential of design automation tools.
At GritTech the traditional development process for a typical module involved 30 or
more discrete steps which were performed in a sequential, isolated fashion. Experience
with this process taught the designers that the traditional process would often lead to the
propagation of flaws which would remain undiscovered until late in the development cycle
where rework can be a most costly and time consuming process. For instance, a small
misinterpretation of the customer’s specifications on the part of the contractor early on in
the development process could embed a flaw in the design that could escape detection until
field tests are conducted at the end of the development chain. Corrective action in this case
could very well be a lengthy and expensive process. Even when errors remain undetected
for only a few steps in a sequential process, the result could be significant budget and
schedule overruns.
GritTech’s answer to the productivity problem was to search for development
processes which tightly integrated the diverse tasks so that they could be performed in
parallel with rapid feedback and feedforward of information among all tasks. They believed
that productivity would increase dramatically if the person doing a task could see the impact
of a contemplated change on the results of all other tasks within minutes, rather than
months.
2.2.1 General Process Characteristics and Philosophy
The rapid development process is composed of several technical and procedural elements.
The relative importance of an individual element depends on the type of development
                                                
5 This is a pseudonym for a defense electronics firm’s rapid development group whose practices were studied
for this report. The pseudonym is being used, at the request of the firm, in the interests of preserving
confidentiality.
project at hand. Reflecting a kind of “skunk works” approach to project management, the
designers responsible for the undertaking are given a wide degree of latitude in tailoring the
process to the needs of the current project.
In addition, designers involved in rapid development projects generally have more
responsibility for the project than designers working on a more traditionally managed
program. For instance, the actual system designers are often personally involved in
meetings with the customer. Project managers are also more involved with the day-to-day
work of the designers, often getting involved in actual design activities themselves. The
combination of broader esponsibility for designers and more involvement by project
managers facilitates better assessment of the current status and rate of completion of project
work.
The rapid development designers are all high caliber engineers. If some “ilities”6 are
not required to satisfy customer requirements and are tailored out of the official project
process in order to meet tight scheduling constraints, the individual designers will still try
to account for them informally as a part of exercising “good engineering practice”. For
instance, consider a technology demonstration project under such time pressure that tasks
such as explicit design activities, which are meant to ensure a certain degree of
expandability, are tailored out of the official project process. However, a project engineer
may still include some spare pin locations on a board in order to easily accommodate the
addition of more memory or processing power in case it becomes necessary to increase the
functionality of the system in the future.
A major tenet of the rapid development operating philosophy is to utilize all
available means to enhance productivity and to allow the designers to experiment with new
technologies to accomplish this. This tenet manifests itself operationally in a number of
ways. For instance, designers in the rapid development group at GritTech utilize the
Internet o get advice from outside experts. Frequently, assistance and advice can be
obtained for free from the many technically-oriented newsgroups on UseNet. Source code
applicable to a project at hand can also be found via ftp (file transfer protocol) or gopher
sites. This tenet has also manifested itself in the willingness of designers to experiment
                                                
6 “ilities” is shorthand for a class of design considerations such as manufacturability, affordability,
supportability, scalability, upgradability, producibility.
with and adopt new design tools. In several instances designers have even adopted new
design tools and used them for the first time on actual projects that were already in process,
believing that the tools would help them perform their tasks better and faster.7
Typical rapid development projects do not attempt to extend the state-of-the-art in
electronic hardware and software technologies. Most involve exploiting state-of-the-shelf
technologies in new ways to produce a desired capability or set of capabilities. Demanding
schedules are part of the norm.
To reduce the risks involved with development projects, the group does not usually
attempt projects unless it has had some prior experience with the technologies involved. In
some cases the group has even conducted some rapid prototyping activities before
submitting a bid to ensure that risks are understood. Sometimes even hardware components
will be part of the rapid prototyping effort. To further reduce risks involved in a
development project, rapid development engineers will use real data whenever it is available
since simulated data can be imperfect.
2.2.2 Examples of Rapid Development
As previously mentioned, GritTech’s rapid development process and operating philosophy
allow engineers extensive latitude in tailoring the process to the particular needs of the
project. Moreover, most of the projects performed by the rapid development group at
GritTech do not involve product line systems. Hence, it is useful to briefly examine a
couple of rapid development projects—one hardware/software system and one software
application—to gain a better understanding of the methodology.
Hardware/Software System Development
A good example of the application of GritTech’s rapid development philosophy to
hardware/software system development involved the design and development of an
acoustic processor. The objective was to take a power-hungry, computation i tensive
system and develop a portable, low-power system providing equivalent functionality. Since
                                                
7 Another aspect of this constant search for new tools and methods is the group’s resistance to
standardization of tools and processes. According to rapid development engineers, the traditional usage of
standardization—one in which tools and processes that are standardized remain the company’s standard even
though much better tools and processes may exist—overly constrains the ability of a designer to use the
best available tools and methods.
the chosen low-power processor provided only a fraction of the original system’s
computational power, it was necessary to decrease the computational load of the algorithms
without appreciably degrading the performance of the system. Adding to the challenge was
a four month development schedule.
Since simulation models were not available for some components that had b en
chosen for use, the hardware design needed to be prototyped and verified before the actual
printed circuit board was fabricated. While wire wrapping—the traditional prototyping
technology—can be relatively inexpensive, it was not flexible enough for the project’s
demanding schedule. The wrapping of the initial design can take a week, and corrections to
the design can be time consuming and are often not properly documented, which can cause
significant problems during hardware debugging. Consequently, a new, flexible prototype
technology was chosen—Field Programmable Interconnect (FPIC) devices and Field
Programmable Circuit Boards (FPCBs).8
Utilizing the flexible prototyping technology, the prototype could be dynamically
reconfigured based on changes to the schematic—a capability that proved i s wor h on
many occasions. For instance, an easily-acquired SRAM (Static Random Access Memory)
was used initially instead of the desired SRAM since the special, low-power SRAM
selected for the design was unavailable at the start of hardware development. When the
desired components were delivered, the design schematics were updated to account for the
different packaging and pin layout, and the new netlist was downloaded to the FPCB
within minutes. In the course of development, a bit-swap error was detected which could
have forced an entire bus change and a one day delay if wire wrapping had been used.
Instead, the FPCB-FPIC combination enabled a corrected design to be up and running
within minutes.
The flexibility of the prototype technology allowed the hardware design to be
completely debugged in one week without the aid of computer simulations. A conventional
                                                
8 The FPIC is a commercially-available RAM-based passive routing device, containing over 900 usable
input/output pins. The FPCB is a multilayer circuit board accommodating an array of pin sockets and a
mounting area for one or more FPICs. A circuit is constructed by placing components on the board and
configuring the FPICs. The FPIC also has a dedicated logic-analyzer diagnostic port. Extensive software
tools for translating netlist information into component placement, FPIC inter alrouting, and logic-
analyzer configuration information are also available from the vendor. FPIC and FPCB are trademarks of
Aptix Corporation.
printed circuit board layout was performed concurrently with the hardware design
verification effort, and schematic changes made as a result of the debugging effort were
automatically included in the printed circuit board (PCB) layout. After only one week of
testing, the PCB was shipped for fabrication using the identical netlist that had been
validated on the prototype. When the bare PCB was delivered, the components were
dropped in, and the system was thoroughly tested. After two days of testing, no defects
were discovered, and the board was declared finished with no cuts or jumpers required. No
problems have been reported in subsequent operational use.
While the PCB was being fabricated, the application software was being coded and
tested using the integrated evelopment environment, which included the FPCB-FPIC
prototype, an in-system processor emulator, networked logic analysis instruments, a
“reference design” from a previous project, and additional signal processing analysis tools
running on a workstation. A depiction of this environment is shown in Figure 2.2. The
combination of the ability to control the hardware and test equipment from the workstation
by downloading and uploading code, data, and sequencing information and the ability to
orchestrate the use of the various assets with operating system scripts provided designers
with a powerful, integrated rapid development environment. Moreover, having a completed
printed circuit board in a little more than one month enabled the designers to focus their
efforts on developing more sophisticated algorithms during the remaining three months and
achieve better field-test results.
In addition to the speed of development afforded by the integrated environment,
application software development was further accelerated through the use of several
routines that were obtained from bulletin boards on the Internet. These routines provided
the needed throughput with minimal modification.
According to the designers, the success of the rapid development project could be
attributed to the use of a combination of newer technologies which resulted in a major
reduction in development time. Compared to estimates of traditional development effort
based on a benchmark of 15 staff-months/board for typical module development
productivity, the hardware/software effort required only 16 percentof the engineering
staff-months. Thus, by combining an integrated development environment with
Figure 2.2: Integrated Development Environment
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programmable prototype methods, the GritTech rapid development engineers achieved a
factor of six improvement in productivity.
Incremental Software Development
Another example of rapid development in action was the use of the process in the
development of a launch data visualization and advising system. This particular project
arose from the customer’s desire to exploit newly available data visualization capabilities
for a launch vehicle program in 1991. Over 50,000 pressure, temperature, wind direction,
and other sensors were in use during launch preparations. The data stream from these
sensors was being preprocessed and displayed to operating personnel in the form of
instantaneous numeric values. The customer identified a need to display this information
graphically, provide trend information at a glance, enable comparisons to past launches,
and perform related functions.
Rapid development engineers developed a core analysis and display system in about
a month after project launch. This initial release was then installed for evaluation on
computers at the launch facility, off-line from actual launch operations. Incremental release
of the most recent version for customer evaluation occurred approximately every five
weeks. Feedback included the suggestion to add capability to call up video views of the
launch vehicle and the launch pad. The GritTech engineers discovered that the incremental
development and release approach also helps to build a good working relationship with the
customer in addition to speeding up the development process. Design cycles tend to get
progressively shorter with each iteration, partly because the integration of software
modules is performed many times and gets progressively easier.
The incremental development process is depicted in Figure 2.3. Incremental
development utilizes a series of quick low cost field trials of progressively more complete
systems. This approach differs considerably from the traditional approach which defers
field testing until the end of a multi-year, full scale development program.
In the incremental development process, software design and development can
begin as soon as some part of the system specification has been developed. Typically, the
specification or portion of a specification is translated into a field-testable design in about a
month. The customer is then supplied with a copy of the current software for operational or
test range evaluations of the design with the GritTech designers providing support. This
field testing is especially important for evaluating the design of user interfaces and displays.
Based on the results of the joint evaluation, the specification is extended or revised, and the
design is incrementally expanded and/or refined during the next cycle.
The rapid development group has found from past experiences that the optimum time
period for providing customers with opportunities for hands-on evaluation is
approximately once every four to ten weeks. The result is a design that rapidly evolves into
a well-suited, highly functional system with minimal need to expend resources on
Figure 2.3: Incremental Development
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performing rework resulting from erroneous assumptions and interpretations of
requirements.
As was the case with the acoustic processor example, using a highly integrated set
of software development tools facilitated a substantial reduction in the time and effort
required for system development. One tool allowed software ngineers to design the
graphical user interfaces (GUIs) by manipulating basic GUI building blocks available from
a palette. Once the elements were arranged to the satisfaction of the engineer, the actual
source code was produced through automatic code generation. As a rule the generated code
was not touched unless problems could be explicitly traced to it. Another tool which helped
speed development enabled designers to execute the code and see how it worked without
having to compile it first. Software libraries also facilitated the reuse of previously
developed and verified software modules.
Since the launch data visualization system uses virtually all commercial off-the-shelf
workstation and video hardware, development productivity was only measured with
respect to the software development benchmark of 10 standard lines of code per staff-day.
By using a highly integrated suite of software development tools in conjunction with an
incremental development approach, the rapid development team was able to develop this
system and demonstrate an 8:1 improvement in productivity in spite of having to absorb a
significant revision to the performance requirement.
2.2.3 Rapid Development Productivity Performance
To date, the rapid development process has been used on 20 different small to medium
sized projects at GritTech, demonstrating significant productivity improvements over a
traditional process in each case. The improvements in productivity afforded by the rapid
development methodologies and tools for these projects are summarized in Table 2.2 and
Table 2.3 for software and hardware development, respectively. The rapid development
projects have consistently exhibited two to four times the productivity that would be
expected of a traditional process.
Table 2.2: Software Rapid Development Results
Environment
Productivity Improvement
(versus benchmark)
Tailored DoD-STD-2167A 3 to 4:1
Other 3 to 8:1
Table 2.3: Hardware Rapid Development Results
Module Type Type
Productivity Improvement
(versus benchmark)
6 inches x 9 inches
(54 square inches) Microprocessor-Based 2 to 6:1
8 inches x 16 inches
(128 square inches) Logic-Based 2 to 4:1
2.3 HARDWARE/SOFTWARE CODESIGN
Methodologies to support the codesign of hardware/software systems were developed in
response to problems with the traditional process for developing these systems. The
traditional process partitioned the problem into hardware and software elements early in the
development cycle, and then proceeded to develop the two designs in parallel with very
little or no interaction until the end of the process when they were integrated for system
testing. Predictably, the classic approach exhibits many symptoms of a fragmented
process.
Typically, the integration of the hardware and software near the end of the
development cycle is laden with unforeseen problems—many of which can be attributed to
the lack of interaction between the hardware n  software design groups. Any design
changes at this point in the process are likely to significantly impact the system’s cost and
development schedule. In many instances, even when integration itself does not reveal any
problems, the overall system performance can be disappointing. Frequently, the blame is
laid at the feet of the programmers. However, in many cases, the real fault may lie in the
design of a development process which imposes an artificially crisp distinction between
hardware and software design.
2.3.1 Generic Hardware/Software Codesign Process
An alternative approach is to recognize the high degree of coupling that exists between
hardware and software for most complex electronic system design problems and employ a
more flexible design process, where hardware and software development proceed in
parallel with feedback and interaction between the two as the overall system design
matures. The final hardware/software partitioning decision can be made after evaluating
alternate design architectures with respect to such factors as performance, programmability,
reliability, and manufacturability. This type of approach may be termed “hardware/software
codesign”.
According to Kalavade and Lee (1992), hardware/software codesign strategies can
be applied to different levels of design problems including:
• Processor Design. An optimized application-specific processor can be
developed by tailoring both the instruction set and the program for the
application. This type of codesign problem is very difficult.
• System-Level Design. Hardware/software codesign can also be performed at
the system level, where an algorithm is partitioned between custom hardware
and software running on programmable components. The hardware would
typically include discrete components, application-specific integrated circuits
(ASICs),
DSP cores, microprocessors, microcontrollers, or semi-custom logic developed
using FPGAs or logic synthesis tools. Since there are many possible ways to
partition a given design between hardware and software components, evaluating
design configurations with system-level simulation of hardware and software
allows the design space to be more thoroughly explored and is an integral part
of codesign.
• Application-Specific Multiprocessor System Design. The codesign of an
application-specific multiprocessor system is challenging since it involves
choosing a suitable number of processors, an interprocessor communication
(IPC) strategy, and the design of the application software. Since software
synthesis requires partitioning and scheduling the code among the processors,
scheduling techniques must be capable of adapting to changing hardware
configurations. Thus, developing an application-specific multiprocessor system
is an iterative process, involving tradeoffs associated with selecting an optimal
hardware configuration and software partitioning.
A generic hardware/software codesign process is shown in Figure 2.4. The
objective of a codesign methodology is to produce a hardware/software system design that
meets a given set of specifications while satisfying a set of design constraints. Given a
system specification, a designer can utilize high-level functional simulations to develop a
suitable algorithm without making any assumptions concerning specific implementation
details. The next step is to partition the algorithm into hardware and software while
satisfying requirements such as speed, complexity, and flexibility. Operations that are
computationally intensive with fixed operations are usually allocated to hardware.
Algorithm components that may vary for different situations, are less computationally
intensive, may require field programmability, or are not likely to change with time can be
allocated to software (Kalavade and Lee, 1993).
Once the initial partitioning has been performed, the process of synthesizing the
hardware, software, and interface designs can begin. These three activities are tightly
coupled. Changes in one synthesis area significantly affect the others. Hardware synthesis
activities include selecting the programmable processor, which directly impacts the
Figure 2.4: Generic Hardware/Software Codesign Process
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software synthesis activity of selecting a code generator, and determining the appropriate
number of processors and their connectivity, which, in turn, influences the code
partitioning decision and hardware/software interface synthesis. Choices involved in
custom hardware synthesis can range from generating custom data paths to generating
masks for FPGAs. As a part of custom data path design, the register word lengths must be
selected (Kalavade and Lee, 1993).
Depending on the chosen hardware configuration, software synthesis can involve
partitioning and scheduling the code across multiple processors and synthesizing the code
for interprocessor communication—decisions which depend heavily upon the selected
architecture. Partitioning among different processors may be performed with the intent of
optimizing cost functions such as communication cost, memory bandwidth, and local and
global memory sizes. In addition, if the hardware configuration includes use of fixed-point
processors, some algorithmic modifications might be required to minimize finite precision
effects, such as limit cycles and quantization errors (Kalavade and Lee, 1993).
Interface synthesis involves adding latches, FIFO (first in, first out) registers, or
address decoders in hardware and adding code to handle input/output operations and
semaphore synchronization in software. Iterating to explore different design options is the
common method for solving this cyclic problem (Kalavade and Lee, 1993).
After the hardware, software, and interface synthesis tasks have been
accomplished, the hardware/software system design can be simulated within a
heterogeneous simulation environment. Since the simulated hardware must run the
generated software, the simulation environment should allow for the interaction of a
number of different simulators in the event that various specification languages are used.
Simulation results can then be used to verify that the design works as intended and
meets the given system specifications. If the specifications are not satisfied, another
iteration will be needed. Whether it is necessary to perform another iteration of the entire
codesign process or just portions of the process will depend on the nature of the
shortcoming. The simulation results and the hardware and software configurations chosen
for the specific system design can also be used to evaluate the system in terms of
performance and estimates of other factors including power requirements, die area,
component and bus utilization, and manufacturing costs. After using these stimates to
evaluate the design, the designer may choose to repartition the system and experiment with
different designs (Kalavade and Lee, 1993).
Currently, there are several programs that are developing design environments
which support hardware/software codesign or are attempting to incorporate those ideas into
a larger system engineering methodology while developing the enabling tools. The next
two sections provide a sample of these efforts.
2.3.2 The Ptolemy Project
Developed at the University of California at Berkeley, Ptolemy is an environment for
prototyping and simulating heterogeneous systems.9 Heterogeneous systems are systems
involving subsystems having different models of computation and, hence, fundamentally
different approaches to design and simulation. According to Dr. Mark Richards of ARPA,
Ptolemy’s framework allows a designer to mix and match multiple models of computation
more effectively than most design systems. Ptolemy facilitates the interaction of diverse
models of computation through the use of object-oriented principles of polymorphism and
information hiding.
Since the start of the Ptolemy project in 1990, there have been numerous advances
in design, simulation, and code generation. Many of these advances have been incorporated
in Ptolemy in the r alms of dataflow modeling of algorithms, ynthesis of embedded
software from such dataflow models, animation and visualization, multidimensional signal
processing, hardware/software partitioning, VHDL (VHSIC Hardware Description
Language) code generation, and managing complexity through the use of higher-order
functions.10
Ptolemy employs object-oriented software principles in attempting to achieve the
following goals (Buck et al., 1994):
• Agility. The Ptolemy environment should support distinct computational models
to enable each subsystem to be simulated and prototyped in a manner that is
appropriate and natural to that subsystem.
                                                
9 The Ptolemy software is available for the Sun 4 (sparc), DecStation (MIPS), and HP-PA architectures.
System installation requires 90MB of disk space and at least 8MB of physical memory. A scaled-down
demonstration version, called Ptiny Ptolemy, is also available for the same architectures but only requires
12MB of disk space. A copy of Ptolemy can be obtained on tape by calling (510) 643-6687 or via
anonymous ftp from ptolemy.eecs.berkeley.edu. Other on-line information resources can be found in the
newsgroup comp.soft-sys.ptolemy and on the World Wide Web at http://ptolemy.eecs.berkeley.edu.
10 The project joined ARPA’s RASSP program, the subject of the next section, in 1993 as a technology
base developer.
• Heterogeneity. Ptolemy should enable distinct computational models to
coexist seamlessly in order to investigate interactions among subsystems.
• Extensibility. Ptolemy should support seamless integration of new
computational models and allow them to interoperate with existing models with
no modifications to the Ptolemy environment or existing models.
• Friendliness. Ptolemy should employ a modern graphical interface with a
hierarchical block diagram style of representation.
Ptolemy has been used for a wide range of applications including signal processing,
telecommunications, parallel processing, wireless communications, network design, radio
astronomy, real-time systems, and hardware/software codesign.
In the hardware/software codesign application area, Ptolemy is a very powerful tool
since all parts of a hardware/software system can be modeled using the various domains
included in the environment. Modeling both hardware and software within a single
framework allows a designer to explore tradeoffs between hardware and software
implementations of different functions (Buck et al., 1994). Another advantage of being able
to develop hardware and software simultaneously in a design and simulation environment
is that software development does not have to wait for a hardware prototype to be ready in
order to start. In fact, if the manufactured hardware configuration is the same as the
simulated hardware/software system, the actual production software code will have already
been developed and verified.11
2.3.3 Rapid Prototyping of Application Specific Signal Processors12
Initiated in 1993, the Rapid Prototyping of Application Specific Signal Processors
(RASSP) program is a four-year ARPA/Tri-Service initiative aimed at creating a new
process for the development of military signal processors. The program’s objective is to
                                                
11 A good example of how Ptolemy can be used in hardware/software codesign to explore the design space
can be found in Kalavade (1991).
12 Although this program is really just getting started, RASSP’s concepts merit discussion since they
provide a glimpse of design methodologies and capabilities that could be available in the near future. In fact,
according to Dr. Mark Richards, RASSP program manager, substantial progress has already been made
during the program’s first year. This description is based on many interviews (live, phone, and email) with
Dr. Richards and others at ARPA as well as the papers referenced herein.
dramatically improve the process for the development of complex digital systems—
particularly embedded digital signal processors13—in the areas of specification, design,
documentation, manufacturability, and supportability.
Major Goals
The major goals of the RASSP program are:
• 4x reduction in concept-to-fielding cycle time
• Commensurate improvements in quality, life cycle cost, and supportability
• State-of-the-art at the time of fielding
• Systematic design capability at all levels from concept to manufacture
• Commercialization and promulgation of the RASSP process
RASSP Approach
The RASSP approach as three key thrust areas—design methodology, processor
architecture, and design automation. The first key thrust is an incremental refinement of the
design methodology. As currently envisioned, the design methodology will be based on
concurrent engineering practices, using a top-down, VHDL-based design approach. The
methodology will also seek to involve users early and often throughout the design process.
The second thrust is in the area of processor architecture. RASSP will foster the use
of modular hardware and software architectures through the separation of communication,
computation, and control functions and scalable interconnects.
The final thrust is the development of a seamlessly integrated and comprehensive
set of CAD tools. Tools to support all the “ilities” are to be included as well as
manufacturing and system engineering.14 The design environment would also facilitate true
hardware/software codesign and hardware and software synthesis. Hardware and software
                                                
13 While signal processors were chosen as a focal point for the RASSP program, it is hoped that the
processes and tools developed during the program will be broadly applicable to the domain of complex
digital systems.
14 “ilities” is shorthand for a class of design considerations such as manufacturability, affordability,
supportability, scalability, upgradability, producibility.
reuse libraries and an enterprise framework would also be incorporated into the EDA
(Electronic Design Automation) infrastructure.
RASSP Design Methodology
Two major components of the design methodology being explored by the RASSP
developers are top-down concurrent design and the model year concept of design. Th
RASSP design methodology is derived from a top-down approach to system engineering,
starting with a formal specification which is successively refined to finer and finer levels of
detail until the design is finished. Concurrent engineering concepts are applied to modernize
the traditional top-down approach and are expected to contribute significantly to the goal of
reducing design cycle time by a factor of four. Through the use of EDA tools, RASSP
hopes to be able to provide the designer with estimates of factors such as size, weight,
power, cost, and reliability early in the design cycle while the designer is still
experimenting with different algorithms and system architectures.
The RASSP design methodology is also experimenting with a model year approach
to design. Traditionally, DoD has emphasized the development of the best possible
technology at the time of initial concept development. The development of military signal
processors i  no exception. The result of this point design approach is usually the
development of highly optimized custom hardware, interfaces, and software in an attempt
to maximize performance. Moreover, insisting on the use of custom design requirements
frequently results in very long development cycles. Not only does this introduce a
significant delay in the delivery of prototypes to potential users for operational evaluation,
but it can also lead to the procurement of systems that are already obsolete by the time they
are fielded. Typically, upgrading point designs is also a difficult and expensive proposition
because of the highly optimized design of the original system.
In contrast to this traditional approach, the model year design methodology—
derived from the practices of top commercial electronics companies—primarily utilizes
existing hardware and software technology to rapidly develop a baseline system based on a
subset or relaxed set of specifications. The resulting prototype can be delivered to the user
for test and evaluation earlier than with the traditional approach, which also allows the
designers to get user feedback faster. Subsequently, the design can be upgraded to correct
Figure 2.5: Model Year Design vs. Point Design
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any functional problems and insert more recent technology into the system. Over the length
of time required to field a point design, a hardware/software system designed according to
the model year philosophy may evolve through several design cycles (Richards, 1994).
Thus, the model year approach to design can place a capability in the hands of the user
earlier and enable the fielded system to keep pace with the rate of technological advance. A
conceptual depiction comparing the point design and model year design approaches is
shown in Figure 2.5.
As illustrated in Figure 2.5, the model year methodology assumes the performance
of commercially available technology improves rapidly. As long as commercial technology
continues to improve rapidly, the successive refinement of a system design through the use
of several short design cycles will produce better performance than the point design
approach even if the original model year design sacrifices ome desired performance.
Moreover, the improved level of performance can be achieved with a markedly decreased
dependence on costly, hard-to-maintain custom hardware and software (Richards, 1994).
Use of a model year approach also creates a number of benefits for the user. First, a
higher-performance signal processor can be acquired for a low r design cost. Second,
since the processor is based on standard supportable technology, life cycle support costs
are lower. Evolving model year prototypes supply the user with prototype hardware and
software early and often, providing a means for discovering flaws in the system
specifications while they are still correctable. The result is a product that is well suited to
the needs of the user (Richards, 1994).
RASSP Architectural Concepts
The RASSP architectural concepts do not prescribe a specific processor design. Rather,
they form a flexible framework for DSP design and provide architectural guidelines to be
observed in order to realize the full potential of the model year design paradigm. The
architectural concepts include scalability, modularity, flexible interfaces, heterogeneity, and
life cycle support (Richards, 1994).
• Scalability. Although the program is focusing on the embedded DSP domain,
the performance range that must be addressed is still sizable. To meet the
objectives of the RASSP program, architectural ideas should be scalable to
satisfy performance requirements ranging from a few megaflops to tens or
possibly hundreds of gigaflops.
• Modularity. An efficient model year development process cannot be achieved
unless each succeeding design cycle is able to build upon the work of previous
cycles. Thus, processor architectures must facilitate the design and reuse of
hardware and software in a modular fashion to allow portions of the processor
to be upgraded without a wholesale redesign of the system.
• Flexible Interfaces. The processor subsystems should employ interfaces based
on scalable, open hardware designs and software communication protocols.
Since the interfaces to the actual sensor and to displays or data processors will
generally be beyond the control of the RASSP designer, flexibility in interface
capabilities will be a must. The combination of modularized hardware with
standard interfaces between modules will localize the impact of design changes
to the portions of the system being redesigned or upgraded.
• Heterogeneity. A key point is that RASSP is not biased toward any one
particular implementation technology, such as ASICs or programmable devices.
Instead, it is assumed that the RASSP design system must be able to handle
combinations of custom, hardware programmable, and software programmable
implementation techniques. In terms of the hardware mix, a RASSP processor
could include custom ASICs, FPGAs, and a fully programmable embedded
processor composed of commercial off-the-shelf DSPs, RISC processors, and
high performance computing modules. This mix of computing elements
illustrates the need for architectures (and a design system) capable of managing
heterogeneity.
• Life Cycle Support. This architectural requirement addresses concerns related to
upgradability and testability. The use of modular hardware and software and
flexible interfaces within a model year design framework will ensure that the
system will be upgradable. RASSP processors will be designed for extensive
hierarchical testability from the start as part of the concurrent engineering thrust
to improve product quality and reduce the cost of field maintenance and
support.
RASSP Development Environment
As currently envisioned, the RASSP development environment will support the designer
from the earliest phase of requirements capture to the most detailed board and ASIC design,
enabling full requirements traceability, virtual prototyping, and a smooth transition int
manufacturing. A streamlined epiction of the RASSP design flow is shown in
Figure 2.6. The development process starts with requirements capture during the system
definition phase. RASSP is currently investigating the feasibility of using VHDL-based
simulatable specifications as a portion of the processor equirements specification. A
VHDL specification would implicitly represent both hardware and software functionality
and could then be expanded, refined, and partitioned into explicit hardware and software
modules.15 Ultimately, the VHDL specification could be used as an input to synthesis tools
                                                
15 Technology base contractors have already released a version of a VHDL-based specification language
incorporating area, speed, and power constraints. In addition, work has already begun on developing VHDL
libraries of common microprocessor models.

or reuse libraries. In addition, a simulatable specification could be used to specify a test
bench at the highest level of system definition. More detailed tests could then be derived
from this “master test” as the design matures while maintaining traceability to the original
system-level test (Richards, 1994).
After the system requirements are specified, a functional design of the system
comprising algorithms and control is developed to satisfy the requirements without
allocating specific functions to hardware or software. The next step is to partition the
functional design into hardware and software implementations. At this point major
architectural tradeoffs are investigated to determine how the functionality should be divided
between hardware and software and how the allocated functionality should be
implemented, such as which parts of the algorithm need to be impl mented in FPGAs
rather than in code on an embedded processor or which parts of the software must be
written in assembly language instead of a higher-order language. Other tradeoffs could
involve choosing between a single or a multiple processor configuration or choosing a
particular microprocessor or DSP for use in the system. These architectural choices will
have major downstream implications for performance, cost, and supportability. Once the
partitioning of the system design into hardware an  software has been completed, the
hardware and software designs are then r fined and evaluated. The hardware/software
codesign process—functional specification, partitioning, and hardware and software design
and evaluation—is iterated as required in order to obtain a solution which meets
performance r quirements while satisfying constraints such as cost, form factor, and
power. To this end, tools capable of providing early estimates of performance, cost, and
physical characteristics need to be available to the designer to enable the development of a
robust processor design (Richards, 1994).
The hardware/software design process is augmented through the use of design
databases and virtual prototyping. In order for the model year design methodology to be
both efficient and effective, synthesis and reuse of both hardware and software modules
must be promoted and facilitated by the design environment. This requirement implies the
need for a comprehensive database system capable of displaying multiple views of the
design data throughout the development process. To further enhance the efficiency and
effectiveness of the design process, virtual prototyping is used to explore design options
and ensure specifications compliance and traceability. The virtual prototype is comprised
entirely of software during the earlystages of the process, but increases in hardware
content as the design matures. Advanced hardware and software co-simulation technology,
such as the ability to mix different models of computation and the ability to allow
simulation tools, emulators, and hardware interact hrough simulation backplanes, is
required for the potential of virtual prototyping to be realized (Richards, 1994).
A full-fledged RASSP development environment will also include many high-level
systems engineering tools not shown in Figure 2.6. Examples of such tools include
workflow management tools, cost models, advisors to assist the designer in making early
architectural decisions, “ilities” analysis tools to aid in evaluating designs for such concerns
as reliability and manufacturability, and documentation and report generation tools
(Richards, 1994).
Although current computer-aided design and computer-aided software engineering
tools for hardware and software development are relatively mature, integrating these tools
across design levels and vendors is still a non-trivial task. Further, while some tools exist
for higher level tasks such as requirements capture, functional specification, and algorithm
development, they are not as mature as the lower level tools or as well integrated with one
another as the lower level tools. In addition, efforts to integrate these higher level tools with
the lower level tools are in their infancy. Consequently, while the integration of the lower
level tools will certainly be addressed, the development, refinement, and integration of the
high level system engineering tools will likely engage a larger portion of the program’s
efforts (Richards, 1994).
2.4 CLEANROOM SOFTWARE ENGINEERING
Early software development was based entirely on craft practices, characterized by a
reliance on trial-and-error methods and the talents of individual programmers. This sort of
development, which is still in use in many organizations, designs software in an
unstructured, bottom-up manner. The conventional wisdom is that no program can be
developed defect free. Rather, debugging is the standard method of getting software to
work properly. The ensuing rapid growth in demand for additional functionality has led to
tremendous growth in the complexity of software designs, complicating the already
difficult task of writing correct programs.
A significant advance in software development capabilities came with the advent of
structured programming techniques in the 1970s. This improvement was precipitated by
Dijkstra (1969) who advocated eliminating the use of GOTO statements and restricting
control ogic to just three forms: sequence (begin-end), alternation (if-then-else), and
iteration (while-do). The arbitrary branching allowed by the GOTO statement provided
programmers with great freedom in designing control structures and was considered to be
the mainstay of programming ingenuity and creativity (Mills, 1986). However, this
freedom was a double-edged sword. Undisciplined use of GOTO statements frequently
resulted in the development of “spaghetti code”—programs with extremely complicated
control structures. Up to this point, writing spaghetti code seemed to be necessary to
satisfy the demands of the customer, and the three control structures appeared inadequate
compared to the power of GOTO statements. Rank and file programmers were surprised to
discover that the control logic of any flowchartable program—even spaghetti code—could
be replicated by utilizing combinations of the three primitives. Furthermore, in contrast to
spaghetti code, the structured programming approach defined a natural hierarchy among its
instructions (Mills, 1986). Adopting this approach allowed developers to write structured
programs in a top-down fashion. Many organizations also implemented code reviews to
augment debugging. Implementation f structured programming produced significant
quality and productivity improvements over the traditional trial-and-error methods, as
shown in Table 2.4.
However, even with the aid of structured programming practices, software
development remains largely dependent on craft-based practices. Conventional methods can
be categorized as follows (SET, 1993):
• Process-oriented. These methods were strongly influenced by th  sequential
flow of computation supported by traditional programming languages, such as
COBOL and FORTRAN. Identifying the principal processes of the system and
the data flows among these processes is the focus of these methodologies.
Yourdon’s Structured Analysis and Structured Design is an example of a
process-oriented system development method.
• Data-oriented. These methods are based on the importance of data fil s and
databases in large business and industrial applications. In data-oriented
methodologies, system processes are designed to support the data processing
requirements of the application. Information Engineering is an example of a
data-oriented method.
• Object-oriented. These system development methods focus primarily on objects
and classes. A system is developed by designing the interaction of objects—
identifiable entities encapsulating statesand behavior—to generate a desired
outcome. Coad-Yourdon object-oriented analysis and design is an example of
this type of methodology.
Unfortunately, the use of these methods has not ignificantly elevated software
development above its craft origins. Similarly, the introduction of advanced SEEs
(software engineering environments), new life cycle models, and maturity models h ve
yielded some improvements in quality and productivity, but not the quantum leaps that
were hoped for. While these innovations are important, they do not address the root cause
of the problem—the lack of a science base for software development (SET, 1993).
Cleanroom engineering addresses the quality and productivity problems by
applying rigorous practices to achieve intellectual control over the project. It also
establishes an “errors are not acceptable” attitude and makes quality a team responsibility.
Furthermore, the software’s reliability is certified through the application of statistical
quality control methods. When compared to traditional and structured programming
methods, the number of defects encountered during development and operational use is
dramatically lower for software developed with Cleanroom engineering practices.
Moreover, Cleanroom practices yield major improvements in productivity. Data comparing
the defect densities and productivities of traditional, structured programming, and
Cleanroom practices are shown in Table 2.4.
2.4.1 Fundamental Principles of Cleanroom Engineering
Cleanroom engineering, developed at IBM’s Federal Systems Division in the 1980s, is
named after the cleanrooms used to fabricate VLSI (Very Large Scale Integrated) circuits.
Table 2.4: A Comparison of Software Development Practices
Development Practices Development
Defects/KLOC
Operational
Defects/KLOC
Productivity (LOC/Staff-
Month)
Traditional 50-60 15-18 unknown
Structured Programming 20-40 2-4 75-475
Cleanroom <5 <<1 >750
Source: SET (1993)
Like its namesake, Cleanroom engineering has no tolerance for defects. The ultimate
objective of Cleanroom software engineering is to develop error-free software that
functions perfectly from the first time it is tested to the end of its operational life.
The following sections describe four fundamental principles behind Cleanroom
engineering: defect prevention, intellectual control, separation of development and testing,
and certification of the software’s reliability.
Defect Prevention
Cleanroom engineering espouses a “get it right the first time” attitude. Defects are not the
result of bugs in the source code. Defects are the result of faults in one or more aspects of
the development process. In fact, if the defect density of the software under development
exceeds five defects per thousand lines of code, the offending software is discarded. The
defects are examined to determine how the process failed and how the process canbe
improved to prevent the failure from recurring. The improved process is used to develop
replacement software.16
Intellectual Control
Intellectual control is the ability to clearly understand and describe the present problem at
the desired level of abstraction (SET, 1993). Schedule overruns, cost escalation, high
defect densities, and the labor-intensive, craft nature of current software development
practices are all symptoms of a process that is not under intellectual control. To achieve
intellectual control, engineers must be equipped with theoretically sound intellectual tools
                                                
16 Dr. Harlan Mills, one of the originators of Cleanroom engineering, has suggested that perhaps the most
important tool for Cleanroom is the wastebasket (Mills and Poore, 1988).
and processes that give them a high probability of producing a correct solution. Enabling
engineers to achieve and maintain intellectual control over projects is at the heart of the
Cleanroom philosophy.
Separation of Development and Testing
Cleanroom engineering principles dictate that development and testing functions must be
separated. Designers are not allowed to execute or test their own code. Only testers can
compile and executed the software being developed. This may seem counterintuitive at
first, but the reasons behind the separation are sound. First, since the developer cannot rely
on debugging as a development crutch, he or she will focus more attention on writing
correct software, rather than on finding and fixing errors. Second, debugging frequently
imbeds deeper errors that are difficult to detect. Adams (1984) studied every failure report
for nine of IBM’s most widely used software products over several years and tracked each
to its origin. In most cases the cause of the failure had been introduced by a fix for another
failure.17 The defects introduced by the fixes may not be found until the integration testing
phase or during operational use by the customer. Debugging tends to produce software that
is locally correct but globally incorrect.
Reliability Certification
Software reliability certification in Cleanroom engineering provides scientifically valid data
that can be used to write warranty statements for software product quality. Reliability
certification also provides feedback to development and management regarding the
effectiveness of the software development process. Software is not released unless it meets
or exceeds the mandated level of reliability.
2.4.2 Cleanroom Engineering Practices
The concepts expressed in the principles of Cleanr om engineering are reflected in its
practices. The following sections describe some of the key practices behind Cleanroom
engineering.
                                                
17 The problem of bad fixes is well documented. In addition to the Adams study, Endres (1975), Fagan
(1976), Jones (1978), Myers (1976), Shooman (1983), and Thayer (1978) all address the topic.
Structured Data
Increasing demands for software capability have resulted in the explosive growth of a data
flow jungle that is just as tangled as the control flow jungle that existed before the advent of
structured programming. Since arrays and pointers represent arbitrary access to data just as
GOTO statements represent arbitrary access to instructions, Cleanroom practices
recommends that randomly accessed arrays and pointers should not be used (Mills, 1986).
These data structures should be replaced with such structures as queues, stacks, and sets.
These structures are considered safer since their access methods are more disciplined
(Head, 1994). In addition, while it may take more thinking to design programs without
arrays, the resulting designs are better conceived and usually have more function per
instruction than programs that utilize arrays. According to Mills (1986), independent
estimates indicate that programs utilizing structured data flows have up to five times as
much function per instruction than would be expected of programs utilizing arrays.
Incremental Development
Incremental development is used to help give designers intellectual control over the problem
as well as maintain focus on the task at hand. By partitioning the development problem into
manageable increments (usually less than 10,000 lines of code and less than eight staff
months of effort), intellectual control over the development of complex systems can be
established. Each increment defines a complete, user-executable system with added
functionality over previous increments. Once an initial understanding of the requirements is
achieved, the system is partitioned into increments based on criteria such as increment size,
component reuse, and development team skills. While the requirements for unprecedented
systems may not be entirely known, the portions that are known should be stable.
Additional requirements can be brought under control and introduced at reasonable
intervals. Increments may also be left open in certain aspects for later updates. Thus,
further steps of requirements determination can be performed with each increment
specification (SET, 1993).
Team Organization
Cleanroom projects involve three different types of teams: specification, development, and
certification. Specification teams are responsible for preparing and maintaining the system
specifications. Configuration management is the responsibility of the specification team.
Development teams design and build one or more of the software increments. The
resulting source code is handed over to the certification team who compiles and tests the
software. Development teams are also responsible for isolating and making any necessary
changes to the increment. The number of development teams used on a project depends on
the size of the system to be developed.
Each certification team prepares test cases for an increment. When the increment is
submitted for certification, the team performs the testing and prepares the certification
report. A certification team executes and tests the code but does not modify it in any way.
Failures are reported to the appropriate development team for correction. As was the case
with development teams, the number of certification teams depends on the size of the
system to be developed.
Engineers can serve on more than one team. For instance, an engineer may work on
the specification team and the development team. However, engineers are not normally
members of the development and certification teams because of the principle of separation
of development and testing (SET, 1993).
Box Structure Design
Cleanroom provides a rigorous basis for developing software by exploiting
the fact that programs are rules for mathematical functions. The
specification for a program must define a function that completely describes
the behavior required for the software to fulfill its intended role. Finding
and documenting this function is a specification task. Designing and
implementing a correct procedure for the specified function is a
development task.
The mathematical nature of software is leveraged in Cleanroom through the
application of box structure mathematics to software specification and development. In fact,
the underlying mathematical foundations of box structures permit the scale-
up of analysis and design to systems of arbitrary size. Consequently, specifiers
and developers only need to work with three classes of functions: black boxes, state boxes,
and clear boxes. Each of these box structures exhibits identical external behavior, but with
an increasing degree of internal visibility. Figure 2.7 depicts the three box structures.
The technical details of box structure design are crucial for understanding the
implications of this method. Details are provided in Appendix A. Important elements of the
methodology will be highlighted below.
A black box provides an implementation-free, object-oriented description of
software. This box structure only describes the software’s external behavior in terms of a
mathematical function that maps a stimulus history, S*, to a response, R. Since the black
box view excludes all details of internal structures and operations, it also provides a
description of the user’s view of system behavior.
A state box provides a data-oriented view that begins to define implementation
details by modifying the black box to represent responses in terms of the current stimulus,
S, and state data that contains the stimulus histories.
A clear box provides a process-oriented view that completes the i l mentation
details by modifying the state box view to represent responses in t rms of the current
stimulus, state data, and invocations of lower level black boxes.
The effective use of box structure design methods for the development of systems
is guided by the application of six basic box structure principles: referential transparency,
transaction closure, state migration, common services, correct design trail, and efficient
verification.
Referential Transparency. Each object is logically independent of the rest of the
system and can be designed to satisfy a well defined “local” behavior specification.
Transaction Closure. The principle of transaction closure defines a systematic, iterative
specification process to ensure that a sound and complete set of transactions is identified
to achieve the required system behavior.
State Migration. State data is identified and stored in the data abstraction at the lowest
level in the box structure hierarchy that includes all references to that data. The result is that
state data can easily be transferred to the lowest feasible level.
Common Services. System parts with multiple uses are defined as common services for
reusability. In the same way, predefined common services, such as database management
systems and reuse objects, are incorporated into the design in a natural manner. The results
are smaller systems and designs which accommodate reuse objects.
Correct Design Trail. It is important to insure consistency in the entire design trail
when correcting an error.
Efficient Verification. It is only necessary to verify what is changed from one
refinement to the next since all elements of the design are referentially transparent.
Figure 2.7: Box Structure Diagram
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Designing software with box structures is performed in a top-down manner. Once the top-
down design is completed, the clear boxes can be implemented in code. The software code
is verified by demonstrating the equivalence of the program and the design represented by
the clear box refinement. While system design proceeds in a top-down fashion, the
implementation of the design is accomplished in a bottom-up fashion. Designing top-down
and then coding bottom-up allows the developers to exploit fully the principle of common
services during the design phase and generalize the common services as much as possible
during the coding phase.
Functional Verification
In Cleanroom engineering, functional verification is used instead of unit debugging.18
These functional verifications typically yield surprising improvements in design, even for
the best software engineers. As a result, the developed software can be smaller and faster
than previously thought possible, delivering more functionality per instruction. In addition,
using functional verification allows quality to be designed into the software. According to
Cobb and Mills (1990), functional verification leaves only two to five defects per thousand
lines of code to be fixed in later phases of the life cycle whereas debugging leaves 10 to 30
defects per thousand lines of code. In contrast o functional verification, debugging
attempts to test quality into the product. H wever, since more than 15 percent of the
corrections merely introduce newer, d eper errors, testing quality into software is not
possible (SET, 1993).19
Statistical Testing
Cleanroom engineering makes use of statistical usage testing to certify the reliability of the
developed software in terms of its MTTF (Mean Time To Failure). The application of
rigorous statistical theory allows both quality control of the software being developed and
process control over the development of the software.20
                                                
18 A more detailed discussion of functional verification practices is available in Appendix A.
19 DeMarco (1982) contains an excellent analysis which demonstrates the validity of this point. Testing
seems to be capable of eliminating half of the software defects. However, this factor of two improvement is
overwhelmed by the extreme variability in the quality of software being produced today.
20 A more detailed discussion of statistical testing practices is available in Appendix A.
2.4.3 Cleanroom Engineering Process
Cleanroom projects follow a defined process which details the control structure between all
processes and practices to be used in the project. Organizations which practice Cleanroom
software engineering typically possess a set of defined processes where each defined
process is intended for use with a different class of development project. Each of these
defined processes, in turn, can be tailored to satisfy the specific needs of the project at
hand.
Large development projects employ a spiral development process which partitions
the problem into smaller, more manageable projects or spirals. Decomposing a large
problem into smaller pieces reduces risk by establishing intermediate evaluation points.
This allows projects to be redirected if necessary. Partitioning the development problem
also enables the use of intermediate deliveries. This practice can be used to keep
development efforts focused, elicit user feedback, and help assess the progress of the
project. Figure 2.8 depicts the Cleanroom spiral development process.
Each spiral is divided into four quadrants or phases: planning, specification,
development and certification, and analysis. The planning phase is where the project
blueprint is devised. During this phase, the appropriate defined process model is chosen
and tailored to the needs of the current development project. If an appropriate process
model does not exist, a suitable process must be designed. Other planning activities include
conducting risk analyses and setting objectives for each spiral (SET, 1993).
Figure 2.8: Cleanroom Engineering Spiral Development Process
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During the specification phase, system specification development activities are performed.
Typically, this involves close cooperation between the specification team and the customer
and system users. Specification development tasks include analyzing the problem and
solution domains. Problem domain analysis involves reverse engineering similar systems,
developing the usage profile in the form of a Markov model, and formulating black box
specification models. The formulation of black box functi ns is a critical task since it
defines the functional behavior of the system to be developed. By defining the functional
behavior of the system, the specification establishes wh t is to be done, not h w. Solution
domain analysis can involve such activities as reuse analysis and rapid prototyping. In
Cleanroom engineering, the rapid prototyping process is similar to the standard Cleanroom
process. The rapid prototyping process also includes planning, specification, development,
and certification phases. However, once these phases have been completed, experiments
can be conducted to acquire any additional information that may be necessary for
specification development. While the specification team is responsible for prototype
development and experimentation, development and certification teams are also typically
involved in the process. When the prototyping effort ends, system modules that were
developed and certified are placed in the project reuse repository and can be used by the
development team to design and build the final product.
The construction plan for the spiral is also produced during the specification phase.
Its purpose is to lay out a plan for the activities of the development and certification teams.
The construction plan contains the actual modules and functions that are to be developed for
each increment. Since each increment is integrated with the previous ones, the plan also
defines the cumulative functionality that will need to be certified following the development
of each increment.
The third phase of a spiral is the development and certification phase. Development
and certification activities are performed in parallel. Development activities include
designing each increment top-down with box structures, implementing the design in code,
and verifying the correctness of the code through functional verification. Typically, design
languages and automated code generation are used as much as possible to translate designs
into code. During this time, the certification team formulates test cases. Once the
development team delivers the source code for the current increment, it is integrated with
the previous increments and tested. If defects are detected, it is reported to the development
team for correction. The corrected code is delivered to the certification team for re-
evaluation.
Analysis is the final phase of the Cleanroom spiral. The results of the development
cycle are analyzed in this phase. In addition, system demonstration and follow-up
appraisals can be conducted (SET, 1993). The results of the work performed in this portion
of the development cycle serve as inputs to the planning activities of the next spiral.
Each successive spiral builds on the work of the previous spirals. For instance, the
specification for the overall system is developed in an iterative spiral. Each specification
iteration further extends and/or refines the system specification.
2.4.4 Proven Benefits
Cleanroom is not a blue sky concept. The methodology is currently in use by many
software engineering organizations across the United States and internationally as well. The
implementation of Cleanroom engineering methods has consistently produced significant
improvements in quality and productivity. A sample of the results of some Cleanroom
projects is shown in Table 2.5.
Table 2.5: Sample of Cleanroom Results
Year Project Results
1987 Flight Control
33 KLOC (Jovial)
•  Completed Ahead of schedule
•  <2.5 defects/KLOC before any execution
•  Defect-fix effort reduced by a factor of five
1988 Commercial  product
80 KLOC (PL/I)
•  Certification testng failure rate of 3.4 defects/KLOC
•  Deployment failures of 0.1 defects/KLOC
•  Productivity of 740 LOC/staff-month
1989 Satellite control
30 KLOC (Fortran)
•  Certification testing failure rate of 3.3 defects/KLOC
•  50% quality improvement
•  80% productivity improvement
•  Productivity of 780 LOC/staff-month
1990 Research project
12 KLOC (Ada and ADL)
•  Certified to 0.9978 reliability
•  Certification testing failure rate of 1.7 defects/KLOC
Source: Cobb and Mills (1990), Mills (1991).
A technology transfer effort implemented Cleanroom engineering processes and practices at
a Picatinny Arsenal software engineering center and achieved impressive improvements
immediately. The Picatinny software engineers improved their productivity by a factor of
three on the very first increment on which the new methodology was used. The failure rate
also displayed dramatic improvement. The failure rate for the first increment was only 0.24
failures per thousand lines of code (Sherer et al., 1994).
Even partial implementation of Cleanroom processes and practices seem to make
substantial improvements. Head (1994) reported significant improvements from
implementing just a few of the Cleanroom practices at Hewlett-Packard. A defect density of
one defect per thousand lines of code was achieved on the first application of these
practices to a project.
CHAPTER 3
Evaluating the New Methods
Now that we have described some of the fundamental ideas and practices behind a selected
set of complex electronic system development methodologies, we must define a set of
criteria by which to assess their utility for lean hardware/software development. Once a set
of criteria and a rating scheme have been devised, the evaluations can be conducted to
determine which methodology, if any, can be used for the lean development of complex
electronic systems.
3.1 THE CRITERIA
To define a set of criteria that would characterize an ideal lean development methodology
for electronic hardware and software, the characteristics of lean product development and
high performance software ngineering processes were considered as well as relevant
system design issues. Successive rounds of distillation removed criteria that were thought
to be redundant or nonessential for the purposes of this report. The final set of criteria is
not a comprehensive checklist of everything necessary to define a lean hardware/software
development methodology. It does, however, define a key set of process traits, which have
been widely associated in other contexts with successful product development processes,
and system design issues that should be encompassed by an ideal lean hardware/software
development methodology. The final set of criteria is shown in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Ideal Cross-System Integration Methodology Criteria
Process Characteristics •  Defined
•  Configuration management
•  User involvement
•  Transparent
•  Tailorable
•  Rapid development cycle
•  Scalable methodology
•  Defect0free
•  Continuous improvement & lessons learned
Systems Design Issues •  Manufacturability
•  Supportability
•  Upgradability
•  Scalable architechture
•  Hardware/software design
The first nine criteria fall into the category of process characteristics. The rest of the
criteria are system design issues that should be accounted for by an ideal lean
hardware/software development methodology. The criteria are defined and the reasons
behind their selection are discussed in the subsections that follow.
3.1.1 Process Characteristics
Defined
A hardware/software d velopment methodology should follow a defined process.
Experience has shown that developing hardware/software systems with an ad hoc approach
usually results in poor project performance. Poor system performance and the all too
familiar schedule and cost overruns are usually the results of a poorly defined process.
Even if the project is successful, the lack of a defined process diminishes the chances that
the success can be repeated (Boehm, 1976; Cusumano, 1991; Paulk et al., 1993a and
1993b).
Configuration Management
The system design configuration must be kept up-do-date so that designers can have the
most current information at their disposal. This is a basic function for hardware/software
system development (Paulk et al., 1993a and 1993b; Cusumano, 1991). Configuration
management activities include identifying the design configuration at certain points in time,
systematically controlling changes to the design configuration, and maintaining the integrity
and traceability of the configuration throughout the development cycle.
User Involvement
Users must be involved throughout the development process to ensure thatthe system
meets their needs, which are often different from the stated requirements (SAF/AQK, 1992;
IBM, 1990). A higher degree of user involvement enables the designers to gain a better
understanding of the users’ “true” requirements. This is particularly true for programs
where man-machine interfaces are a factor.
An example of the utility of user involvement can be found in the discussion of
GritTech’s rapid development process located in Chapter 2. Without user involvement, the
rapid development engineers would not have known to address the unstated requirement
for a capability to call up video views of the launch vehicle and the launch pad. Adding this
functionality to the system would have been significantly more problematic and costly to
accomplish later in the development cycle.
The design of AH-64 Apache crew station provides another example of the utility of
user involvement in the development process. Conforming to MIL-STD-704A, the
Apache’s electronic systems were interconnected with its two onboard generation systems
so that a single generator could supply power for all the electronic systems in case one of
the generators failed or was switched off. No one had anticipated that both generators could
be switched off in-flight, which happened once inadvertently while flying nap-of-the-earth
during the flight test phase. The pilot’s partially rolled up sleeve caught both generator
switches, switching off electrical power for all onboard systems except for the few items
powered by battery. Only the skillful reactions of the crew averted a tragedy. Accordingly,
the generator switches were subsequently redesigned to be lever-locked in the “on” position
(Amer et al., 1992).
Transparent
The methodology should be easily understood by designers and managers alike. In
addition, the process should allow development progress to be easily measured and tracked
on a continuous basis. Transparency allows problems to be identified earlier in the
development cycle when they are not as costly to fix. A lack of transparency is a commonly
cited problem for project management, particularly in the development of software-
intensive systems (Paulk et al., 1993a and 1993b; SAF/AQK, 1992; Cusumano, 1991).
Tailorable
A single, defined process cannot be appropriate for all possible development projects.
SDC’s (System Development Corporation) experiments with a factory approach to
software development in the mid-1970s, documented in Cusumano (1991), failed in part
from the use of the standardized process on projects with widely varying needs.
Predictably, the factory approach worked well on the types of development projects for
which it was designed but produced disappointing results when applied to projects that
were beyond the intended scope of the process (Cusumano, 1991). Attempting to define a
single standard process to handle all situations typically results in a non-transparent,
byzantine process that is unwieldy at best (Hammer and Champy, 1993). Thus, an ideal
process should be tailorable to meet the particular needs of a project.
Rapid Development Cycle
A rapid development cycle, a basic element of lean or total quality product development
processes (Womack et al., 1991; Ling, 1993; Clausing, 1994), is important for a number
of reasons. First, a rapid development cycle places new capabilities in the hands of the
warrior faster. Moreover, rapid development cycles are needed to ensure that systems are
state of the art when fielded. Currently, development cycles are so lengthy that some
systems can be obsolete by the time they are fielded. Rapid development cycles can also
facilitate timely upgrading of current systems to keep their capabilities at or near the rapidly
improving state of the art in hardware and software technology.
Scalable Methodology
An ideal methodology would be efficient and effective for both relatively simple and
extremely complex hardware/software system development. For instance, there are
processes that appear extremely efficient and effective for developing small systems.
However, when applied to a larger development project, information flows which were
crucial to the success of the process for smaller projects can break down—particularly the
informal channels, primarily due to the larger number of people involved.1 Similarly,
design methods that work well for small problems can be swamped by the number of
constraints and variables involved in solving larger, more complex design problems.
Moreover, a scalable methodology is needed to keep pace with the increasing complexity of
electronic system development problems.
Defect-Free
An ideal methodology should aim to “get it right the first time” and develop a high-quality,
defect-free finished product. Unfortunately, while this is usually thegoal, the finished
product has not always lived up to these expectations in the past. In spite of the myriad
process and product standards that have been imposed on defense contractors, systems
have been deployed with known defects. For instance, CAFMS (Computer Assisted Force
Management System), a computer system used to develop air tasking orders, was deployed
to the Gulf with several known software defects. In all, there were 81 major software
changes made during Desert Shield and Desert Storm. While some were the result of the
growing scale of operations, many changes were made to fix known problems that had
been brought to the field and others that appeared during Desert Shield (Hyde et al., 1992).
Defect prevention practices must be a part of a methodology to fully satisfy this
criterion. In the absence of defect prevention practices, methodologies which aim to
produce a defect-free product can only partially satisfy this criterion since they tend to rely
on substantial amounts of testing to detect defects for subsequent removal rather than
preventing their introduction. Defect prevention is significantly more effective for assuring
product quality than testing (Head, 1994).
Continuous Improvement & Lessons Learned
Continuous improvement, an essential element of total quality development (Clausing,
1994), should be part of an ideal cross-system integration methodology. Continuous
improvement and documenting lessons learned are critical for fostering organizational
                                                
1 This sort of problem is well documented in the literature by Lawrence and Lorsch (1967), Lawrence et al.
(1976), and Lawrence and Lorsch (1986).
learning.2 While defect prevention activities are covered by the defect-free criterion, there
are certainly numerous other process aspects that could be improved. For instance, it may
be possible to accelerate the pace of development activities by rearranging certain elements
in the workflow. In addition, technical and process-related lessons learned during each
project should be documented so that they are not forgotten. Subsequent projects should
benefit from this knowledge, not just the individuals who participated. Toyota’s “lessons
learned” books provide a good example of this (Ward et al., 1994). For example, one book
is comprised of lessons learned in fender design and contains approximately 60-72
different key ranges of specifications that would ensure the manufacturability of fende
designs. These lessons learned books, which exist for every body part, allow Toyota
designers to ensure their designs are manufacturable from the start (Ward et al., 1994).
3.1.2 System Design Issues
Manufacturability
An ideal methodology should produce a design that is manufacturable. Manufacturing
processes should be able to produce the integrated system and all its components in an
efficient, affordable manner. Since the design of a product can, by some estimates,
determine as much as 70 to 8  percent of manufacturing productivity, it is critical to
address manufacturability ssues during the design phase (Suh, 1990). Design for
manufacturability is another basic element of lean product development (Womack et al.,
1991; Ling, 1993; Clausing, 1994).
In the past, manufacturability problems have required costly redesign efforts to
correct. Printed wiring boards, used extensively throughout the LANTIRN system (Low-
Altitude Navigation Targeting Infrared for Night), had to be redesigned because the hand-
made boards tended to fracture when machined and could not pass the required acceptance
tests (Bodilly, 1993b). Manufacturability problems with the AMRAAM (Advanced
Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile) missile led to the establishment of the $330 million
AMRAAM Producibility Enhancement Program (Mayer, 1993). Manufacturability
problems and a failed aluminum casting process forced a very costly redesign of the
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and Argyris (1991 and 1993).
stealthy TSSAM (Tri-Service Standoff Attack Missile), and have provided ammunition to
those calling for the cancellation of the program (Morrocco, 1993; Fulghum, 1994e;
Fulghum and Morrocco, 1994).
Supportability
Systems should also be easy to maintain in the field. Historically, maintenance costs of
hardware/software systems exceed that of original system development. If operations and
maintenance costs are included in a software life cycle cost breakdown, they account for 67
percent of the total life cycle cost (Cusumano, 1991).3 From the hardware perspective,
maintenance tests and diagnostics should be easy to perform and crucial areas should be as
easily accessible as possible. Similarly, software components should be easy to access,
test, and replace.
Supportability has become an increasingly important consideration in the
development of weapon systems and their subsystems. Both the Air Force’s Advanced
Tactical Fighter and the Army’s Light Helicopter competitions placed great emphasis on
supportability issues (Nordwall, 1993; Bond, 1991; Kandebo, 1991). Supportability
problems with Pratt & Whitney’s F100-PW-100 and -200 engines—used in the Air
Force’s F-15 and F-16 fighters, respectively—provided a major part of the motivation for
the initiation of the Alternative Fighter Engine (AFE) competition. In addition to addressing
a stall-stagnation problem, the AFE competition addressed the F100’s extremely short
lifetime—the period of time between depot overhauls—and its high maintenance
requirements which drove up operating costs (Camm, 1993a).
Upgradability
Considering the typically lengthy service lives of many defense systems4 a d the rapid pace
of improvement in hardware and software technology, an ideal methodology should yield
an upgradable product. This would allow a fielded system to keep pace with
                                                
3 This frequently reflects the costs imposed by a defective product and a flawed process that developed it.
Activities in this portion of the life cycle are needed to fix errors that escaped detection during development
and to give it the functionality that users really wanted.
4 For example, the F-4 has been in service since the 1960s, and the F-15 and F-16 fighters have been in
service since the 1970s.
technology over its service lifetime with greater ease and less expense than is required by
current approaches.
Scalable Architecture
An ideal methodology should produce a system architecture that can be extended to fulfill
the evolving needs of the user over the service life of the system. Typically, systems will
be called upon to perform functions that were not part of the original design requirements
or are much larger in scope. An ideal methodology should yield an architecture that can
scale up to meet the new challenges. Recent events point to the need for scalable
architectures. CAFMS was not designed to handle the number of air bases or the size of the
ATO required in Desert Storm. Fortunately, we had the luxury of five months with which
to enhance the system with additional processors and storage devices, some of them newly
acquired, and with software changes engineered in the desert (Hyde et al., 1992).
Current efforts to add data fusion capabilities and other enhancements to AWACS
presents another example where non-scalable architectures are causing problems. Although
AWACS performed brilliantly during the Gulf War, the demands of the scope and pace of
allied operations were beginning to push the system to the limits of its capabilities
(Lenorovitz, 1992a). Unfortunately, the aging centralized mainframe computer architecture
makes it more difficult to enhance system capabilities or add the latest in distributed
computer hardware. For instance, the 1500 lb. electronics unit that drives the AWACS
displays is not programmable which makes it difficult to devise and implement better ways
to display data with software modifications. Making similar enhancement or upgrades for
JSTARS aircraft is much easier because of its distributed, open architecture which utilizes
high-speed commercial off-the-shelf engineering workstations (Hughes, 1994a; 1994b).
HW/SW Codesign
An ideal methodology should allow for interaction and tradeoffs between hardware and
software development to balance flexibility, performance, and cost within each separate
system. Traditionally, system functionality is partitioned between hardware and software
early on in the development process, and subsequent development activities are pursued
with little or no interaction between the groups responsible for the implementations. The
result is often unsatisfactory performance. Codesign allows more interaction and tradeoffs
between hardware and software implementations. This allows a more thorough exploration
of the “design space” which yields an end product that provides a better balance of single
system flexibility, performance, and cost.
3.2 THE RATING SCHEME
The rating scheme chosen to evaluate the different methodologies is fairly straightforward.
For each criterion, three different ratings are possible: satisfies, partially satisfies, and does
not satisfy.
3.3 THE EVALUATIONS
This section contains the evaluations of each of the methodologies described in the previous
chapter. The results of the evaluations are shown in two matrices corresponding to the two
categories of criteria. T ble 3.2 shows how the methodologies rated according to the
process characteristics criteria. Table 3.3 shows how the methodologies rated according to
the system design issues criteria. The reasons behind the ratings are provided in the
subsections that follow.
3.3.1 DC-X Rapid Development
The reasons behind the ratings of this methodology are discussed in thi  section on a
criterion-by-criterion basis.
Defined Satisfies. This process follows a defined process.
Configuration ManagementSatisfies. The process has mechanisms for configuration
management.
User Involvement Satisfies. The process allows simulations, which can be
tested by users, to be produced in parallel with th  flight
software.
Table 3.2: Process Criteria Matrix
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Transparent Satisfies. Designers and managers have a good sense of the
status of the project and the rate of progress.
Tailorable Satisfies. The process is tailorable to the needs of the
project.
Rapid Development Cycle Satisfies. The process is characterized by a rapid
development cycle and fully utilizes rapid prototyping.
Scalable Methodology Does Not Satisfy. The methodology is not scalable. The
process is highly dependent upon a toolset which seems to
“break” when applied to large problems.
Table 3.3: System Design Criteria Matrix
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Defect-Free Partially Satisfies. The process seeks to develop a defect-free
product, but does not practice defect prevention.
Continuous Improvement &
Lessons Learned Does Not Satisfy. This process has no provisions for
continuous improvement or documenting lessons learned.
The DC-X rapid development process does not satisfy any of the criteria pertaining
to the system design issues since there is no provision in the process for the consideration
of these issues.
3.3 .2 GritTech Rapid Development Evaluation
The reasons behind the ratings of GritTech’s rapid development methodology are discussed
in this section on a criterion-by-criterion basis.
Defined Satisfies. The GritTech rapid development group has a
defined process.
Configuration Management Satisfies. The process has mechanisms for configuration
management.
User Involvement Satisfies. User involvement is integral to the success of the
software development approach practiced by GritTech.
Transparent Satisfies. Designers and managers have a good sense of the
status of the project and the rate of progress.
Tailorable Satisfies. The GritTech rapid development process is highly.
Designers have great freedom over tailoring the process to
the needs of the project in question.
Rapid Development CycleSatisfies. The process is characterized by a rapid
development cycle.
Scalable Methodology Does Not Satisfy. The methodology relies heavily on
informal communication among team members. Since the
information flows would break down for large projects, the
methodology is not scalable.
Defect-Free Partially Satisfies. The process seeks to develop a defect-free
product, but does not practice defect prevention.
Continuous Improvement &
Lessons Learned Partially Satisfies. Since activities associated with
continuous improvement and documenting lessons learned
are conducted at the discretion of the development team, they
are not always performed.
Manufacturability Partially Satisfies. The process can include this
consideration, but it can be (and has been) tailored out of the
process in the interests of speeding up the development
cycle.
Supportability Partially Satisfies. Again, this consideration can be a part of
the process, but it can be tailored out of the process.
The GritTech rapid development process does not satisfy any of the remaining
system design criteria since the methodology has no provision for the consideration of
these issues.
3.3.3 Ptolemy Hardware/Software Codesign Evaluation
The reasons behind the ratings of a Ptolemy-supported hardware/software codesign
methodology are discussed in this section on a criterion-by-criterion basis.
Defined Satisfies. This process follows a defined process.
Configuration ManagementSatisfies. The process has mechanisms for configuration
management.
User Involvement Does Not Satisfy. HW/SW codesign does not involve the
user in the design process, partially due to the fact that it
relies on other methods to perform requirements capture.
Transparent Satisfies. Progress is easy to monitor with this
methodology.
Tailorable Satisfies. The process is tailorable depending on the
type of codesign problem involved. Different types of
problem require the application of different design
methodologies.
Rapid Development CycleSatisfies. The process is characterized by a rapid
development cycle.
Scalable Methodology Partially Satisfies. The methodology is scalable for a large
range of design problems, but it is not capable of including
the use of high-level languages in the codesign process.
Defect-Free Partially Satisfies. The process seeks to develop a defect-free
product, but does not practice defect prevention.
Continuous Improvement &
Lessons Learned Does Not Satisfy. This methodology does not currently
include activities for continuous improvement and
documenting lessons learned.
Manufacturability Partially Satisfies. Depending on the specific development
project, estimates of the cost to manufacture a design are
considered.
Supportability Does Not Satisfy. Supportability is not currently considered
by Ptolemy-supported codesign.
Upgradability Does Not Satisfy. Upgradability is not currently considered
by Ptolemy-supported HW/SW codesign.
Scalable Architecture Partially Satisfies. Depending on the specific development
project, scalable architectures can be developed.
HW/SW Codesign Partially Satisfies. The design method is limited to tradeoffs
between hardware and low-level software. High-level
software is not included in the codesign process.
3.3.4 RASSP Evaluation
RASSP was evaluated even though its work is still in its infancy. This evaluation will help
see what future improvements (if any) there may be. The reasons behind the ratings of
RASSP development methodology are discussed in this section on a criterion-by-criterion
basis.
Defined Satisfies. This process follows a defined process.
Configuration ManagementSatisfies. The process has mechanisms for configuration
management.
User Involvement Satisfies. Users become a part of the development process in
the model year design concept.
Transparent Satisfies. Virtual prototyping and the workflow management
features of the RASSP development environment provide a
high level of transparency in the development process.
Tailorable Satisfies. The RASSP process will be tailorable to the needs
of the project at hand. Some of the tailoring will come
naturally as a result of the design methodologies required to
solve the current design problem.
Rapid Development CycleSatisfies. The process is characterized by a rapid
development cycle.
Scalable Methodology Satisfies. The methodology is applicable to a broad range of
digital systems design.
Defect-Free Partially Satisfies. The process seeks to develop a defect-free
product, but does not practice defect prevention.
Continuous Improvement &
Lessons Learned Satisfies. The methodology utilizes continuous improvement
and documents the lessons learned from ach model year
design.
Manufacturability Satisfies. This is a design consideration of the RASSP
design methodology.
Supportability Partially Satisfies. While RASSP does satisfy this criterion
for embedded digital systems, it does not ensure
supportability for the range of systems that an ideal lean
hardware/software development methodology would need to
address.
Upgradability Partially Satisfies. The model year concept of design
emphasizes the development of upgradable designs.
However, while RASSP does satisfy this criterion for
embedded digital systems, it does not ensure upgradability
for the range of systems that an ideal hardware/software
development methodology would need to address.
Scalable Architecture Partially Satisfies. While RASSP does satisfy this criterion
for embedded digital systems, it does not ensure scalable
architectures for the range of systems that an ideal
hardware/software development methodology would need to
address.
HW/SW Codesign Partially Satisfies. While RASSP does satisfy this criterion
for embedded digital systems, the design method is limited
to tradeoffs between hardware and low-level software.
High-level software is not included in the codesign process.
3.3.5 Cleanroom Engineering Evaluation
The reasons behind the ratings of the Cleanroom engineering methodology are discussed in
this section on a criterion-by-criterion basis.
Defined Satisfies. This process follows a defined process.
Configuration ManagementSatisfies. The process has mechanisms for configuration
management, which is performed by the specification team.
User Involvement Satisfies. In the least, users are deeply involved in the
specification phase of each project spiral.
Transparent Satisfies. The detailed specifications and top-down design
with box structures provide a good sense of project status
and progress. Metrics tracked during the project also usually
provide an accurate gauge of progress.
Tailorable Satisfies. Project planning tasks include tailoring the process
to the needs of the current project.
Rapid Development CycleSatisfies. The process is characterized by high productivity
and a rapid development cycle.
Scalable Methodology Satisfies. Box structure design and functional verification
practices are scalable.
Defect-Free Satisfies. This methodology involves defect prevention.
Continuous Improvement &
Lessons Learned Satisfies. Activities related to continuous improvement and
documenting lessons learned are performed in the analysis
phase of each project spiral as well as at the end of the
development project.
Manufacturability Does Not Satisfy. Manufacturability is not currently
considered in Cleanroom engineering.
Supportability Partially Satisfies. Referential transparency and box structure
design produce a supportable software design. However,
Cleanroom does not ensure the design of supportable
hardware.
Upgradability Partially Satisfies. Referential transparency and box structure
design produce an upgradable software design. However,
Cleanroom does not ensure the design of upgradable
hardware.
Scalable Architecture Partially Satisfies. Referential transparency and box structure
design produce a software design that can be easily extended
and enhanced. However, Cleanroom does not ensure the
design of scalable hardware architectures.
HW/SW Codesign Does Not Satisfy. Hardware/software codesign is not part of
Cleanroom engineering practices.
3.4 CONCLUSIONS
In terms of process characteristics, only Cleanroom engineering satisfied all the criteria.
RASSP also scored very well, but fell just short on the defect-free criterion. The other
methodologies all displayed shortcomings on multiple counts (see Table 3.2). Thus, it
appears from this standpoint hat methodologies exist that have general process
characteristics that could provide a good foundation for a lean hardware/software system
development methodology.
Unfortunately, a glance at the system design criteria matrix in Table 3.3 indicates
that none of these methodologies are directly applicable as a lean development methodology
in their current form. Very few of the system design issues are addressed by any of these
methodologies. Moreover, when these issues are addressed at all, the methodologies
usually only partially satisfy the criteria.
Based upon these evaluations, we can make the following conclusions:
• There are methodologies that possess general process characteristics that would
provide a good basis for a lean hardware/software development methodology.
• Very few of the system design issues are addressed by these methodologies.
• None of the complex electronic system development methodologies in their
current forms can meet th  need for a lean hardware/software development
methodology.
CHAPTER 4
Conclusions
Electronic hardware and software are k y determinants of the performance of defense
systems. Current challenges include devising a development methodology capable of
scaling to cope with increasing complexity and producing a high-quality product that is
affordable, upgradable, evolvable, and maintainable.
Several methodologies for developing complex electronic systems were evaluated in
the previous chapter to determine if any could be employed directly as a lean
hardware/software development methodology. The results indicated that while th re are
development methodologies that possess the process characteristics of an ideal
hardware/software development methodology, very few of the important system design
issues are addressed. Thus, none of the complex electronic system development
methodologies is capable in its current state of adequately addressing all the challe es
associated with the development of modern complex electronic systems. This finding has
major implications.
4.1 TACKLING THE HARDWARE/SOFTWARE
DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGE
While none of the methodologies evaluated in the previous chapter can adequately serve as
a lean development methodology for complex electronic systems, the process criteria matrix
shown in Table 3.2 indicates that a some of them exhibit process characteristics that
could provide a good foundation for an effective hardware/software d velopment
methodology. Specifically, this foundation could be provided by Cleanroom engineering,
the RASSP design methodology, or a combination of the two methodologies.
Cleanroom engineering fully satisfied all the criteria related to process
characteristics. However, it only partially satisfied the system design criteria of
supportability, upgradability, and scalable architecture since it does not adequately address
these aspects of hardware design. The strengths of Cleanroom engineering include a
scalable design methodology that exploits the benefits of common services, referential
transparency, functional verification, and statistical testing to produce early defect-free
software. The originators of Cleanroom emphasize that it is applicable to system
engineering as well as software engineering. Using box structure design, the system can be
designed in a top-down manner. Once the design is completed, the clear boxes can be
implemented in hardware or software. Since Cleanroom engineering is practiced primarily
by the software ngineering community, the process of implementing clear boxes in
software is well understood. The process of implementing clear boxes in electronic
hardware is not as mature. Cleanroom engineering does not adequately address digital
hardware design issues, nor is it equipped to deal with tradeoffs between hardware and
software. For instance, while Cleanroom engineering ensures the development of an
upgradable software design, it does not ensure the development of upgradable electronic
hardware.
The RASSP design methodology fully satisfied all but one of the criteria related to
process characteristics. Moreover, it addressed more system design criteria—
manufacturability, supportability, upgradability, scalable architecture, and
hardware/software codesign—than any other methodology evaluated. It fully satisfied the
manufacturability criterion, but only partially satisfied the others since the program is
focused on the domain of embedded digital signal processors and may not provide an
adequate scope to form a solid foundation for an effective cross-system integration
methodology. In addition, since the methodology is still under development, i  is not
certain that the methodology—especially its system engineering aspects—will be as
scalable as hoped.
The third alternative would involve a combination of the Cleanroom and RASSP
approaches. This option, suggested by the results of the system design criteria evaluation
discussed in Chapter 3, combines the strengths of the two methodologies while addressing
the shortcomings of each. A synergistic combination of aspects of Cleanroom engineering
and the RASSP design approach could provide a solid foundation for a lean development
methodology for electronic hardware/software systems. Cleanroom offers a rigorous
approach to system engineering and software development, and RASSP provides design
methodologies and tools for hardware/software codesign of embedded digital systems.
Developing a methodology that synergistically combines different aspects of
Cleanroom engineering and the RASSP design methodology would not be a trivial
undertaking. Many issues would have to be resolved to accomplish this fusion
successfully. Some of these issues include:
• Can the Cleanroom principle of separation of development and testing be
reconciled with the RASSP approach of rapid prototyping and simulation of
hardware/software systems?
• Can the RASSP capabilities of designing hardware that is manufacturable,
supportable, upgradable, and scalable be integrated into the Cleanroom process
of refining black boxes into clear boxes?
• Are the Cleanroom and RASSP approaches to ensuring supportability,
upgradability, and scalability compatible with each other?
Assuming that a synergistic combination of Cleanroom and RASSP methodologies
is feasible, a next step would be to develop an integrated system engineering environment
to support hardware/software development activities.
4.2 BENEFITS OF LEAN HARDWARE/SOFTWARE
DEVELOPMENT
Lean hardware/software d velopment would have several benefits. First,
development times could be significantly reduced. Use of fast cycle development
methodologies such as Cleanroom engineering, the RASSP design methodology, or the
proposed combination of Cleanroom and RASSP should dramatically cut development
times while producing high-quality products that are scalable, upgradable, and supportable.
Accelerating the development of these systems through the use of such methodologies
would also place needed capabilities in the hands of the warfighters earlier. Moreover, the
fielded systems would be much closer to the state-of-the-art at the time of deployment.
Under current development and acquisition practices, the performance of commercially-
available systems can surpass the projected performance of a defense system before its
development is completed.
Second, lean development as envisioned in this report would allow new and
existing systems to keep pace with the rate of technological dvance. Obsolescence is
especially a concern in electronics and software because of the rapid rate of performance
improvement of these technologies. Since the products of these development projects
would be upgradable and scalable, product capabilities would be much easier to enhance
and extend. Lean hardware/software development would also facilitate the application of
the model-year design concept, which would further enhance the ability to keep pace with
technological advance.
The higher productivity of a lean development methodology would translate into
lower development costs, resulting in a more affordable final product once the decoupled
subsystems are integrated. In addition, since the systems would be upgradable, scalable,
and supportable, life cycle costs would also be significantly reduced (Richards, 1994).
Further cost savings could be generated through reuse of software and hardware designs
and off-the-shelf components. Moreover, applying the principle of common services
during the system design process would facilitate substantial cost savings through the
identification and exploitation of economies of scope.
In addition to these benefits, the fast cycle development approach offers the benefits
of enhanced robustness to budgetary instability and enhanced risk reduction. The primary
vehicle for both of these benefits is speed. Projects that can be completed rapidly are less
likely to experience the effects of budgetary instability since there would be fewer
opportunities for budgetary changes during development. Maximum robustness would be
achieved by projects that could be completed within a single budget cycle. Risk would be
reduced in two ways. First, rather than conducting numerous risk assessments and
analyses, a real system or prototype would be rapidly developed which would provide
more accurate estimates of the risks involved based on actual experience and data. In
addition, producing real hardware and software provides a more tangible result than the
traditional risk reduction approach of extensive analyses, documentation, and ilestone
reviews. With all other factors equal, a project that can demonstrate working hardware or
software is less likely to experience budget cutbacks than a project that only has reams of
analyses and documentation to show for its money. Thus, the benefits of lean development
of complex electronic systems would include improving robustness to budgetary instability
and reducing development risks.
To summarize, the lean development of complex electronic systems as envisioned
in this report would provide the following benefits:
• Reuse of hardware and software designs
• Rapid development of needed capabilities
• State-of-the-art operational systems
• Greater affordability
• Enhanced robustness to budgetary instability
• Reduced development risk
4.3 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This report is the start of a study of how to address the challenge of devising a development
methodology capable of scaling to cope with increasing complexity and producing a high-
quality product that is affordable, upgradable, evolvable, and maintainable. This problem is
very complex, but there are concepts and methodologies—some of which are
unconventional—that point the way to a solution.
4.3.1 Conclusions
• The effective and efficient development of electronics is critical to future U.S.
military capabilities.
• To address the challenges inherent in the development of defense electronics, a
lean hardware/software development methodology is needed.
• Although there are complex electronic system development methods that meet
some of the criteria of a good hardware/software development methodology,
none of the methods studied can be readily applied in its current form as a lean
methodology for developing electronic systems.
• Cleanroom engineering and the RASSP design methodology rated the best in
terms of process characteristics, but satisfy only a few of the system design
criteria.
• Cleanroom engineering and the RASSP design methodology could be combined
to form a foundation for a lean development methodology.
4.3.2 Recommendations
• Combine Cleanroom engineering and RASSP design practices synergistically to
form a core from which to develop a lean hardware/software development
methodology. Cleanroom engineering offers a rigorous methodology for
system and software ngineering that can scale-up to permit the design of
systems of arbitrary size. The RASSP design methodology offers a scalable
approach to designing embedded hardware/software systems.
• Apply fast cycle methods including Cleanroom engineering, the RASSP design
methodology, and/or the proposed combination of Cleanroom and RASSP for
rapid development of electronic systems. The benefits would be systems which
are state-of-the-art at the time of deployment, upgradable, scalable, supportable,
and more affordable. Needed capabilities are fielded faster. Rapid development
also provides for improved robustness to budgetary instability and risk
reduction.
• Specify functional requirements, not implementations (i.e., specify black box
behaviors of subsystems). This provides designers with maximum flexibility in
devising a solution to provide the required functionality.
• Develop an integrated design environment to support the lean development of
hardware/software systems.
4.4 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY
In the course of researching this report, a number of interesting possibilities for further
study were identified. Some of these topics are important subjects related to lean
development that were beyond the scope of this report. Other suggestions include further
study of some of the methodologies that were selected for evaluation in this report. Some
topics are interesting ideas that were encountered during the research process that may have
potential for application in the aerospace industry.
4.4.1 Further Study of Selected Methodologies
While none of the methodologies are directly applicable as a lean hardware/software
development methodology, the Lean Aircraft Initiative would benefit from knowledge
gained from the further study of some of these methods. The following is a list of
recommended actions for this purpose:
• Maintain contact with the ARPA/Tri-Service RASSP program. Draw upon the
findings and the development work being conducted under its auspices.
Monitor the progress of benchmarking activities and the evolution of the design
process. At minimum, the Lean Aircraft Initiative would benefit from increased
insight into the benefits and problems associated with integrated electronic
design environments and collaborative design.
• Maintain contact with the ARPA STARS (Software Technology for Adaptable,
Reliable Systems) program. Currently, this ARPA program is conducting
multiple technology and process demonstration projects, some of which involve
the Cleanroom engineering methodology described in this report. The Initiative
would benefit from the insights generated by these demonstration projects as
well as the wealth of software development data tha will be produced and
collected for analysis.
• Conduct an F-22 avionics development cas  study. It appears from several
phone interviews conducted with former and current members of the avionics
integrated product team that there were a number of substantial improvements
over past programs in the development of avionics and software for the F-22.
Among the innovations i a systems/software engineering environment that
allows the designer to simulate the avionics system from high-level Ada code
down to gate-level hardware functionality. Preliminary research indicates that a
derivative of hardware/software codesign has been used. Other interesting
aspects include the use of common hardware modules and the application of
data fusion to integrate information and display it to the pilot in a more
understandable form rather than requiring integration to take place “between the
headphones”.
4.4.2 Other Interesting Topics
New Development Challenges and Benefits of Better Integration
There are essentially two classes of problems that are important to the overall performance
of a theater system:
• Single system development problems
• Cross-system integration problems
Single system development problems associated with the development of
hardware/software systems are well documented and are the subject of numerous studies
and research programs. However, while the lion’s share of development energies and
system integration activities are focused on optimizing the performance of individual
systems or platforms (Rich and Dews, 1986), effective integration across these
systems is critical to the performance of the overall theater system. In fact,
inadequate integration is just as, if not more, important to theater system performance and
amounts to self-inflicted degradation of military capabilities. Thus, the new
development challenge is to ensure effective integration across systems
through rapid cross-system integration while producing a theater system
that is flexible, rapidly deployable, upgradable, evolvable, and
maintainable.
Effective cross-system integration holds great promise for increasing U.S. military
capabilities. The following list provides a sample of the possible benefits.
1. More information could be transmitted by secure data link rather than voice
communications which are easier to intercept.
2. Effective integration of precision-guided munitions and C4I systems could allow
platforms (e.g., fighter aircraft) to operate with greater stealth since the platform would
not have to use its own emitters to guide the munition to its target.1
3. Better integration can enable in-flight retargeting or rerouting of munitions, such as
cruise missiles, to minimize collateral damage and ensure that primary targets are
struck.
4. Platforms could employ the best munitions for their missions.2
5. U.S. forces could operate more seamlessly with forces from other services and
different countries.
6. Our forces could deploy rapidly with a ready information infrastructure.
7. “Buddy system” tactics could be more easily employed since data and information from
a particular onboard system could be shared with other platforms that were not similarly
equipped.
8. Intelligence could be placed in the hands of the warfighters in a timely and efficient
manner.3
9. Tactical and strategic situational awareness would be significantly enhanced.4
                                                
1 Coarse guidance could be provided by systems such as JSTARS, and terminal guidance could be performed
by the munition’s on-board systems.
2 This would significantly increase the flexibility and robustness of the capability of multi-role platforms.
3 For instance, the most recent satellite imagery of a target area could be provided to pilots enroute to the
objective.
4 Fighter pilots could use AWACS- and JSTARS-supplied data as well as its own sensor data to provide a
more complete tactical picture of the space around them and enable better discrimination between friend and
foe. Data fusion could be used to display the information in a more intuitive manner. Theater commanders
could be provided a “God’s eye view” of all movements of enemy and friendly forces on or above the
battlefield.
10.Effective integration would enable more efficient planning and dissemination of orders
and plans such as the Air Tasking Order.5
Some of the benefits of effective cross-system integration are already being
discovered by some currrent programs, including the F-16 HTS (HARM Targeting
System) and JTIDS (Joint Tactical Information Distribution System). The performance of
newly fielded AN/ASQ-213 HTS-equipped, F-16 Block 50/52D aircraft in the SEAD role
has exceeded prior expectations to such a degree that the USAF believes the future
development of a radar-killing version of the F-15 will be unnecessary. Air Combat
Command is particularly pleased with the ability of the HTS to interact wi hoff-board
sensors such as Rivet Joint.6 Although the HTS was originally intended as an interim
system, planned upgrades should make the F-16 HTS system as capable as the radar-
killing F-15 at a far lower cost (Morrocco and Fulghum, 1994).
JTIDS allows pilots to receive and view AWACS data on a color multifunction
display in the cockpit (Morrocco, 1994). JTIDS allows a pilot to see the whole battlefield.
For instance, instead of being limited to an F-15 radar’s 120-degree forward field of view,
a JTIDS-equipped F-15C provides its pilot with the ability to see all around his aircraft,
including the locations of enemy surface and air threats (Fulghum, 1993e). With the
JTIDS-enhanced situational awareness, the 390th Fighter Squadron, the only F-15C unit
currently equipped with JTIDS, expects to be ableto adopt the line abreast formation
instead of flying in trail (Fulghum, 1993e). This allows forward firepower to be maximized
and should result in greater lethality and fewer U.S. and Coalition losses.
Set-Based Design
As documented by Ward et al. (1994), Toyota’s product development process, which is
seemingly incongruent with widely accepted models of concurrent engineering, provides a
second Toyota paradox. Contrary to conventional wisdom on concurrent engineering,
delaying decisions and making many prototypes can make better cars faster and cheaper
                                                
5 This would enable faster planning cycles and, hence, a faster pace of operations.
6 The F-16 HTS system is considered proof of concept that with additional refinement, a single-seat aircraft
can perform the SEAD role almost as well as a two-seat design. In the future, the electronic warfare officer
could be on board an AWACS or Rivet Joint aircraft instead of in the cockpit of a Wild Weasel aircraft
(Morrocco and Fulghum, 1994).
(Ward et al., 1994). Toyota’s multidisciplinary development teams are neither co-located
nor dedicated to a single project. Instead of trying to freeze specifications as rapidly as
possible, Toyota engineers and managers deliberately delay decisions and provide
deliberately ambiguous information to their supplie s. Moreover, instead of seeking to
minimize the number of prototypes, Toyota and its suppliers produce a seemingly
excessive number of prototypes (Ward et al., 1994).
The key to understanding this development approach is “set-based design”. While
more traditional processes utilize an iterative “point-to-point” design approach, in which the
state of the design moves from one point to another in the “design space”, the Toyota
development approach uses a set of specifications to achieve a solution. Using set-based
design, engineers and managers can test and evaluate numerous prototypes, which allows a
more robust exploration of the design space and enables them to devise a combination of
specifications to produce the most robust car or truck. Moreover, if problems are
encountered during development, a set of possible alternatives exists (McElroy, 1994).
This research provides a number of interesting topics for further study. Could a set-
based concurrent engineering approach be applicable in the aerospace industry? How
would a set-based approach be implemented? What changes would be necessary to
successfully implement a set-based development approach?
Robust Technology Development
Robust technology development during the research and development phase can simplify
and accelerate the product development process. Developed by Dr. Genichi Taguchi, the
originator of quality engineering, Technology Development reduces the risks involved in
introducing new technologies into a product and can significantly reduce the amount of time
devoted to “tweaking” in a product development process (Ealey, 1994; Clausing, 1994).
Technology Development ensures that a technology is capable of overcoming downstream
forces that can introduce variability in the end product (Ealey, 1994).
According to Dr. Taguchi, ensuring “origin quality” through Technology
Development is the most powerful application of quality engineering, providing the greatest
leverage for saving cost and time in the product development process (Ealey, 1994).8 Since
less funding is being allocated for developing and procuring new defense
systems, the quality of the output of research and development activities has become even
more important. It is important for our technology development programs to engage in
robust Technology Development so that designers can merely “tune” the technologies to
yield the desired outcome when it is desired to incorporate the technologies in a new
product. For instance, since JAST (Joint Advanced Strike Technology) seeks to develop
“bins of technology”, a robust Technology Development approach would certainly benefit
future aircraft development programs seeking to mploy JAST-developed technologies.
Clearly, the potential benefits and barriers to the application of Taguchi’s Technology
Development7 concepts during research and development activities merit further study.
                                                
7 Taguchi’s Technology Development has already been applied successfully for several years at Nissan’s
Reliability Engineering Center. An example of its application can be found in Ealey (1994).
APPENDIX
Cleanroom Engineering Supplement
This appendix contains more detailed discussions of three aspects of Cleanroom
engineering. Box structure design is discussed first. The following section discusses
functional verification. The last section provides a more detailed description of the statistical
testing practices of Cleanroom engineering.
A.1 BOX STRUCTURE DESIGN
This section provides a more detailed discussion of box structure design methods.
The different box structures—black boxes, state boxes, and clear boxes—are described
first. The guiding principles of box structure design are discussed next. Finally, the box
structure design algorithm is described. As a reminder, diagrams of the three box structures
are shown again in Figure A.1.
A black box provides an implementation-free, object-oriented description of
software. This box structure only describes the software’s external behavior in terms of a
mathematical function that maps a stimulus history, S*, to a response, R. Since the black
box view excludes all details of internal structures and operations, it also provides a
description of the user’s view of system behavior.
A state box provides a data-oriented view that begins to define implementation
details by modifying the black box to represent responses in terms of the current stimulus,
Figure A.1: Box Structure Diagram
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S, and state data that contains the stimulus histories. To form a state box, a black box is
expanded by adding state data and state machine transitions to black box transitions. Thus,
the state box contains a black box that accepts the external stimulus and the internal state
data as its stimulus and produces both the external response and the new internal state
which replaces the old state as its response. State box behavior can be described in the
transition formula
(Stimulus, Old State) ›  (Response, New State)
A clear box provides a process-oriented view that completes the i l mentation
details by modifying the state box view to represent responses in t rms of the current
stimulus, state data, and invocations of lower level black boxes. To form a clear box, a
state box is expanded by adding procedure structures and delegating parts of the process to
component black boxes. The processing can be defined in terms of three possible
sequential structures—sequence, alternation, and iteration—and a concurrent structure.
The relationships among the black box, state box, and clear box descriptions of a
system or subsystem precisely define the tasks of xpan i n and derivation. Whereas it is
an expansion task to design a state box from a black box or to design a clear box from a
state box, it is a derivation task to abstract a black box from a state box or to abstract a state
box from a clear box. An expansion does not produce a unique product since there are
many state boxes that behave like a given black box and many clear boxes that behave like a
given state box. A derivation, however, produces a unique product since there is only one
black box that behaves like a given state box and only one state box that behaves like a
given clear box (Mills et al., 1987). Expansion and derivation are the basis for box
structure design and verification, as shown in Figure A.2.
The effective use of box structure design methods for the development of systems
is guided by the application of six basic box structure principles: referential transparency,
transaction closure, state migration, common services, correct design trail, and efficient
verification.
Referential Transparency.  This condition occurs when a black box is encapsulated by
the clear box at the next higher level of the usage hierarchy. Each object is logically
independent of the rest of the system and can be designed to satisfy a well defined “local”
behavior specification. Referential transparency simplifies development and produces
designs that are easy to enhance.
Transaction Closure.  The transactions of a system or subsystem should be sufficient
for acquiring and preserving all its state data, and its state data should be sufficient for
completing all its transactions. The principle of transaction closure defines a systematic,
iterative specification process to ensure that a sound and complete set of transactions is
identified to achieve the required system behavior. The result is that the required stimuli,
Figure A.2: Box Structure Expansion and Derivation
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data, and transactions are available at each stage of the design to generate the desired
behavior.
State Migration.  State data is identified and stored in the data abstraction at the lowest
level in the box structure hierarchy that includes all references to that data. The result is that
state data can easily be transferred to the lowest feasible level.
Common Services.  A common service is a data abstraction which is described in a
separate box structure hierarchy, and used in other box-structured systems. System parts
with multiple uses are defined as common services for reusability. In the same way,
predefined common services, such as database management systems and reuse objects, are
incorporated into the design in a atural manner. The results are smaller systems and
designs which accommodate reuse objects.
Correct Design Trail.  It is important to insure consistency in the entire design trail
when correcting an error. If the changes to a previous design document are trivial, the
corrections
can be performed right away without stopping the current design process. However, if the
necessary changes are major, the design process should be stopped until all the corrections
to the previous design documents are made.
Efficient Verification. It is only necessary to verify what is changed from one
refinement to the next since all elements of the design are referentially transparent. In
addition, if the design refinements are conducted in small steps instead of large leaps, each
refinement can be shown to be correct by direct assertion.1 Otherwise, verification might
require the use of rigorous proofs which are significantly more time intensive hanthe
direct assertion approach.
The box structure design algorithm begins with defining and verifying the black
box function for the system. This task is usually accomplished by the specification team
who delivers it to the development team. Once the black box has been defined and verified,
the design is refined by expanding the black box into a state box. Before the state box is
expanded into a clear box, a black box is derived from the state box by eliminating
references to state data in the state box functions and comparing it to the original black box.
If the two black boxes are equivalent, then the state box design is verifi d as correct.
Otherwise, the state box design must be corrected.
After the state box refinement has been verified, the design is refined once more by
expanding the state box into a clear box. Again, the clear box design must be verified by
deriving a state box from the clear box by eliminating references to proc dure and the
internal black boxes it encapsulates and comparing it with the original state box. If the state
boxes are the same, the design process can continue. Otherwise, clear box design must be
iterated until a design can be verified successfully.
Following verification of the refinement, this same process is repeated for each of
the internal black boxes in a stepwise refinement process that ends when all the remaining
internal black boxes represent either single commands of the destination language or
subsystems that have been implemented in a previous increment. This top-down design
process produces a box structure hierarchy, such as the one shown in Figure A.3.
                                                
1 Refining designs in small steps typically creates simple software de igns that are typically correct.
Refining designs in large leaps can increase the chance that errors will be introduced into the design.
Figure A.3: Box Structure Hierarchy
After the top-down box structure design is completed, the clear boxes can be
implemented. Depending on the nature of the system under development, the actual clear
box implementation could be accomplished through an integration of hardware, software,
and human behavior (SET, 1993). For software development, clear boxes are translated
into code through stepwise refinement. The implementation must be verified as correct and
consistent with the clear box design. The software code is verified by demonstrating the
equivalence of the program and the design represented by the clear box refinement. While
system design proceeds in a top-down fashion, the implementation f the design is
accomplished in a bottom-up fashion. Designing top-down and then coding bottom-up
allows the developers to exploit fully the principle of common services during the design
phase and generalize the common services as much as possible during the coding phase.
A.2 FUNCTIONAL VERIFICATION
In Cleanroom engineering, functional verification is used instead of unit debugging. Once a
clear box has been refined into code, the development team uses functional verification to
help structure a proof that the refinement correctly implements the clear box design. If
multiple steps were taken to refine the clear box design to code, the current refinement
would be verified against the last refinement. The principle of referential transparency
allows these smaller proofs to be easily accumulated into a proof for a l rge program.
Unlike the unit debugging practices that are traditionally used, functional verification is
scalable. Experience demonstrates that people are able to master these ideas with little
difficulty and construct proofs for very large software systems (Cobb and Mills, 1990).
These functional verifications typically yield surprising improvements in design,
even for the best software engineers. As a result, the developed software can be smaller
and faster than previously thought possible, delivering more functionality per instruction.
In addition, using functional verification allows quality to be designed into the software.
According to Cobb and Mills (1990), functional verification leaves only two to five defects
per thousand lines of code to be fixed in later phases of the life cycle whereas debugging
leaves 10 to 30 defects per thousand lines of code. In contrast to functional verification,
debugging attempts to test quality into the product. However, since more than 15 percent of
the corrections merely introduce newer, deeper errors, testing quality into software is not
possible (SET, 1993).2
Functional verification and testing seem to exhibit a high degree of synergy.
Functional verification eliminates defects that tend to be difficult to detect with testing. The
defects that remain after inspections and functional verification are generally the type that
can be easily detected with testing. The combination of inspections, functional verification,
and testing can eliminate more than 99 percent of all defects (Head, 1994). Table A.1
summarizes the defect removal performance for a range of different defect detection
strategies.
                                                
2 DeMarco (1982) contains an excellent analysis which demonstrates the validity of this point. Testing
seems to be capable of eliminating half of the software defects. However, this factor of two improvement is
overwhelmed by the extreme variability in the quality of software being produced today.
Table A.1: Defect Removal Percentages of Different Strategies
Detection Strategy % Defects Removed
Testing 50%
Inspections 60%
Inspections + Testing 85%
Inspections + Functional Verification 90%
Inspections + Functional Verification + Testing >99%
Source: Head (1994)
A.3 STATISTICAL TESTING
Cleanroom engineering makes use of statistical usage testing to certify the reliability of the
developed software in terms of its MTTF (Mean Time To Failure). The application of
rigorous statistical theory allows both quality control of the software being developed and
process control over the development of the software.
The testing approach used in Cleanroom projects differs from the prevailing
approach of coverage testing. The goal of Cleanroom testing is to maximize the expected
MTTF of the software under development. Since coverage testing is just as likely to
discover rare execution failures as it is to discover frequent execution failures, an alternative
strategy that focuses on detecting frequent failures is needed. This need is satisfied by
usage testing since its utilization of a statistical usage profile allows the formulation of tests
that are representative of expected usage. In fact, for the purposes of increasing the MTTF
of software, usage testing has been determined to be 21 times more effective than coverage
testing (Cobb and Mills, 1990). Usage testing also typically takes less time than coverage
testing.
The usage profile is represented by a Markov model specifying the probability of
moving from each usage state to all other usage states. The model describes every possible
state that a system can be in, identifies all the different actions that the user could take in
each state, and assigns probabilities to each possible action in each state. The usage profile
can be expressed in a state transition diagram or a matrix.
The requirement specifications and usage profile, which are developed by the
specification team, are used by the certification team to develop a set of random test cases
which are representative of the expected usage. After the current increment is coded and
delivered to the certification team, the current increment is integrated with previous
increments, if any, and the test scenarios are executed. The error history is evaluated with a
mathematical model designed to predict how many more defects the user might encounter in
a certain period of time with a certain number of ses (Head, 1994). As soon as the
reliability model indicates that the developed software meets or exceeds the desired quality
level with a sufficiently small degree of uncertainty, testing is considered complete, and the
product can be safely released.3
Software must be minimally reliable for statistical testing to be valid. Applying
statistical testing to software developed with typical defect densities would cause the
statistical reliability models to blow up. If the model does not blow up, its predictions are
usually extremely unfavorable (Head, 1994). According to Cobb and Mills (1990), defect
densities of five defects per thousand lines of code or less can be tolerated without
invalidating the application of statistical MTTF estimation.4
                                                
3 Currit et al. (1986) describes several statistical models for certifying the reliability of software.
4 The reader may recall that this figure of 5 defects/KLOC was mentioned earlier during a description of the
Cleanroom principle of defect prevention. Apparently, discarding software with high defect densities is done
not only to motivate designers to develop defect-free software but for statistical reasons as well.
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